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Abstract
To prove their Walrasian equilibrium existence theorem, Arrow and Debreu
(1954) devised an abstract economy that Shapley and Shubik (1977) cric-
itized as a market game because, especially with untrustworthy traders, it
fails to determine a credible outcome away from equilibrium. All this ear-
lier work also postulated a Walrasian auctioneer with complete information
about traders’ preferences and endowments. To ensure credible outcomes,
even in disequilibrium, warehousing is introduced into a multi-stage market
game. To achieve Walrasian outcomes in a large economy with incomplete
information, even about traders’ endowments, a strategy-proof demand rev-
elation mechanism is considered, and then extended to include warehousing.
Keywords: market design; demand revelation; strategyproofness; hidden
endowments; warehousing.
JEL classification: C72, D41, D47, D51
1 Introduction and Background
1.1 Perfectly Competitive Spot Markets
Following a literature that extends from Arrow (1951) to Hammond (2011)
and beyond, the equilibrium allocations that result from a perfectly com-
petitive spot market system have efficiency and welfare properties that are
fairly well understood. So are sufficient conditions for Walrasian equilibrium
in such a system to exist. In fact, given any fixed status quo allocation,
such a system, when combined with a suitable “pre-distributive” policy for
distributing any potential gains, can produce an equilibrium allocation that
is Pareto superior to the status quo. That is, except in the uninteresting
special case when the status quo is already Pareto efficient.
Yet ever since Walras’s own writings concerning his concepts of the auc-
tioneer and taˆtonnement, economists have been vexed by the problem of
designing some kind of mechanism or process to ensure that Walrasian equi-
librium in a spot market system could actually be attained.
1.2 Walrasian Taˆtonnement
Originally the question that was asked is whether a taˆtonnement process for
adjusting prices in response to excess demand could converge to a Walrasian
equilibrium. Except in special cases such as when all commodities are “gross
substitutes”, the conclusions were generally rather unsatisfactory — see, for
example, the survey by Hahn (1982). Even the taˆtonnement process itself
required each economic agent to report the appropriate value of its excess
demand function truthfully; there was no discussion of any strategic consid-
erations.
1.3 The Arrow–Debreu “Abstract Economy”
In the standard definition of a non-cooperative game, each player’s feasible
set of strategies is independent of the other players’ strategy choices. By con-
trast, Debreu (1952) introduced the notion of a “generalized game” where,
by definition, each player’s feasible set of strategies may depend on the other
players’ strategy choices. In their classic paper on existence of Walrasian
equilibrium, Arrow and Debreu (1954) constructed an “abstract economy”
as a generalized game which confronts the agents in an economy, who choose
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their own net trade vectors, with an auctioneer who chooses a price vec-
tor. Moreover, the economic agents are limited to choosing respective net
trade vectors that satisfy their budget constraint, which is determined by the
auctioneer’s choice of price vector.
This generalized game was never intended to be a fully specified model
of how any market system, realistic or artificial, could actually function. In-
stead, it merely served as a device allowing Debreu’s (1952) existence theorem
to be applied. This existence theorem relies on arguments that probably owe
more to Glicksberg’s (1952) method of proving existence of Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies, when the set of pure strategies is convex, than to Nash’s
(1951) own proof that a mixed strategy equilibrium exists when there is a
finite set of pure strategies.
1.4 Myerson’s Coordination Device
One obvious issue in using the Arrow–Debreu abstract economy is its essential
reliance on Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. In particular, each
trader must anticipate the auctioneer’s choice of price vector simply in order
to be sure of satisfying the budget constraint. Following the discussion by
Polak (1999) of equilibrium in general games, restrictive epistemic conditions
are required in order to ensure that the players can reach a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium corresponding to a Walrasian equilibrium.
Indeed, a robust market system should be able to handle traders who
know little, and care even less, about one another’s preferences, endowments,
and trading strategies. Formally, following Myerson (1982), one can consider
a mechanism where a completely informed principal suggests a Nash equilib-
rium of the generalized game, which is then a Walrasian equilibrium of the
economy. Nevertheless, the latter part of this paper will move toward what
seems the more relevant case where, in the spirit of Harsanyi (1967–8), the
principal guides the agents to a particular Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a
game with incomplete information.
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1.5 The Shapley–Shubik Critique
Let me quote from footnote 1 of Shapley and Shubik (1977), where they
discuss the market game that Arrow and Debreu (1954) use to prove existence
of Walrasian equilibrium:1
But as a descriptive model [t]his game shares the defect of the
Walras exchange model of being ill defined, or unrealistically de-
fined, away from equilibrium. Indeed, if only one agent departs
from equilibrium, he is presumed to be able to buy and sell at the
stated prices, announced by an added fictive player whose objec-
tive is to minimize excess demand. But there is no explanation
of how the excess demand thereby created is to be satisfied —
unless it is out of the bottomless warehouses of the fictive player.
1.6 The Warehousing Remedy
In mentioning “warehouses”, as well as in introducing their well known model
with trading posts, Shapley and Shubik (1977) implicitly suggest a possible
remedy for this serious deficiency in the Arrow–Debreu market game.2 This
is to allow the Walrasian auctioneer to combine three functions:
1. the traditional Walrasian auctioneer, who chooses a price vector;
2. a coordinator who, like Myerson’s (1982) principal, recommends —
even mandates — both demand and supply vectors for each economic
agent subject to the incentive constraints that these vectors must be
what the agents themselves would be willing to choose given the chosen
price vector;
1The preceding sentence of their footnote reads as follows: “In his important early
paper, Debreu (1952) represents the Walras exchange model as a game in strategic form
for the technical purpose of applying a general existence theorem.” Yet Debreu (1952)
refers to the Walras exchange model only when citing the (then) forthcoming paper by
Arrow and Debreu. So I have changed “his” to “[t]his” in quoting the remainder of the
footnote.
2Thanks to Kenneth Judd for reminding me that Keisler (1995, 1996) uses inventories to
accommodate mismatches between demand and supply during a non-taˆtonnement process
of quantity adjustment to a Walrasian equilibrium.
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3. a warehouse manager, who manages a system that takes in all the
agents’ offered supplies up to their mandated levels, and then allo-
cates whatever total supplies have been made available in order to
meet agents’ demands as far as possible.
The key idea is to allow supplies to be collected before attempting to
meet any demands. In order to do this, one has to consider a game in two
stages, as will be done in Section 4.
1.7 From Vickrey and Harsanyi toward Market Design
Vickrey (1961) proposes a second-price auction for a simple market in which
one committed seller plans to sell one indivisible item to one of several com-
peting buyers. The model anticipates Harsanyi’s (1967) work on adapting
Nash’s theory of non-cooperative strategic games to accommodate incom-
plete information. Following Vickrey and Harsanyi, Wilson (1985) and others
have been able to develop a theory of “double auctions” for a single market
that confronts several competing potential sellers, each with one unit of a
homogenous commodity they might sell, with several competing potential
buyers, each able to buy at most one of those units.
Ideas building on Vickrey’s and Harsanyi’s theories have also been widely
applied to the design of auction markets for a wide range of products. These
include licences in many countries to use parts of the electromagnetic spec-
trum in order to transmit information, as well as “Certificates of Entitlement”
for owning a car in Singapore.
1.8 Hidden Endowments
To the author’s knowledge, however, nobody has yet faced up to the task of
designing a game of incomplete information whose outcomes can reasonably
be expected to generate a Pareto efficient allocation in a general multi-market
system with many traders. This is especially true when, as in the work by
Postlewaite (1979) and by Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995), there
is incomplete information regarding traders’ endowments, and traders can
consume whatever they conceal.
Indeed, it was assumed in Hammond (1979), as well as in later work
surveyed in Hammond (2011, Sections 14–15), that agents would restrict
themselves to reporting types for which the allocation mechanism specified a
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net trade that was feasible given the true endowment vector. The only sanc-
tion facing somebody who violated this constraint was that, if misreporting
their type led to a supply contract being broken, they would be required to
keep reporting a different type until the feasibility constraint was satisfied
and a supply contract was reached that could be honoured. Even this sanc-
tion was left entirely implicit. For an alternative in a two-period setting,
where Walrasian equilibrium may be unattainable, see Hammond (1992).
In the case of financial markets, the need for some radical system re-
design seems entirely evident given events that led to the recent “Great
Recession” in most Western economies. At this stage, however, it would
seem highly premature to suggest how to reform financial markets. For now,
the much less ambitious task of designing a general spot market system that
can implement Walrasian allocations seems challenging enough.
After reviewing a few key approaches to the issues mentioned above, the
main purpose of the paper is to propose a demand revelation mechanism
with warehousing that attempts to meet the suggested requirements.
1.9 Outline of Paper
Section 2 introduces the basic definitions, notation, and assumptions for a
class of pure exchange economies. Thereafter, Section 3 presents a significant
variation of the generalized game that Arrow and Debreu (1954) used to
define their abstract economy. In particular, before the traders are required to
announce their demands, they are informed of the price vector chosen by the
auctioneer or market organizer. Then each trader’s strategy becomes, rather
than the simple demand vector it was in Arrow and Debreu’s generalized
game, an entire demand function of the price that the rules of the game
require always to satisfy the budget constraint. This extension to functions
makes the traders’ strategy sets independent of the auctioneer’s choice of any
one particular price vector. Hence, this variation produces a game rather
than a generalized game.
So far there are no explicit incentives for traders to fulfil their supply
contracts. Following the key idea of Shapley and Shubik (1977), Section 4
considers the implications of requiring all supplies to be collected in a sys-
tem of warehouses or trading posts, before being released to meet traders’
demands as far as possible. Traders can be deterred from default by ex-
cluding all those who break their contracts from any access to warehoused
supplies.
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Next, Section 5 turns attention to the case when the market organizer is
incompletely informed of both traders’ preferences and their endowments. In
this setting, it is well known that there is a strategyproof allocation mecha-
nism guaranteeing Pareto efficient outcomes only if either allocations close to
the dictatorial or oligarchic extremes are selected, or else there is an infinite
population of traders. Contrast, for example, the results of Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983), Serizawa (2002) and Serizawa and Weymark (2003)
with those of Hammond (1979) and Guesnerie (1998). Accordingly, Section
5 introduces the notion of a statistical continuum economy. Earlier work,
including Hart, Hildenbrand and Kohlberg (1974), considers just the distri-
bution of traders’ characteristics as well as their net demand vectors. Here,
by contrast, a joint distribution over traders’ labels as well as their charac-
teristics, net demand vectors, etc. is considered. This relaxes some obvious
symmetry conditions.
Then, building on previous ideas in Hammond (1979), Section 6 con-
structs a strategy-proof demand revelation mechanism that implements Wal-
rasian equilibrium. This works, however, only for the case when traders ulti-
mately limit themselves to revealing demands which guarantee that they can
honour their supply contracts. This leaves open the problem of providing
more effective incentives to dissuade traders from revealing net demand cor-
respondences which create the possibility that they may be asked to supply
more of some goods than their true endowments. To overcome this prob-
lem, Section 7 follows Section 4 in combining warehouses with a two-stage
market system. Each stage uses a demand revelation mechanism like that in
Section 6.
In Section 8, an extensive form game in twenty-two steps is formally
defined. It involves infinitely many traders and one market organizer or
principal who also acts as recording clerk, statistician, auctioneer, market
equilibrator, and warehouse manager. The game implements Walrasian equi-
librium when backward induction is used to eliminate dominated strategies
recursively in relevant continuation subgames of incomplete information, as
well as in the game as a whole.3 In this sense, even when traders’ endow-
ments as well as their preferences are unobservable, appropriate incentives
are created for individuals to reveal their true Walrasian demand correspon-
3Like orthodox subgames, subgames of incomplete information arise as continuations
of an extensive form game after some initial moves have been made. Unlike orthodox
subgames, but like games of incomplete information, the precise continuation subgame
being played typically depends on players’ hidden types.
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dences, and also to deliver whatever supplies are required to reach Walrasian
equilibrium.
The main results, along with their limitations, are reviewed in the con-
cluding section 9, which also contains some ideas for future research concern-
ing extensions beyond spot markets in a pure exchange economy.
Appendix 1 sets out some useful selected results concerning probability
measures on Polish spaces — i.e., complete and separable metric spaces.
Appendix 2 shows how the space of suitably regular closed graph demand
correspondences can be given a metric that makes it a Polish space. Finally,
Appendix 3 offers a proof that a market clearing equilibrium price exists in
our setting where a countably infinite set of traders with random labels are
required to submit demand correspondences satisfying the regularity condi-
tions imposed earlier.
2 A Pure Exchange Economy
2.1 Commodities and Their Prices
Let G denote a finite set of commodities, with typical member g, which
traders may be able to exchange. The commodity space whose members
are vectors such as x = (xg)g∈G will then be denoted by RG. Let 1G =
(1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ RG++ denote the specific vector that has all its components
equal to 1.
Let p = (pg)g∈G ∈ RG+ \ {0} denote a typical semi-positive price vector,
and
P := {p ∈ RG+ |
∑
g∈G
pg = 1} (1)
the unit simplex of normalized price vectors, with relative interior
P 0 := {p ∈ RG++ |
∑
g∈G
pg = 1} (2)
and relative boundary bdP := P \ P 0.
2.2 Traders and Their Endowments
For our initial discussion of a game of complete information with warehous-
ing, we will consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set I of traders.
Each trader i ∈ I is assumed to have a fixed endowment vector ei ∈ RG+.
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We also assume that the commodity set G excludes irrelevant goods g that
cannot be traded because their total endowment
∑
i∈I e
i
g = 0. Accordingly,
we assume that
∑
i∈I e
i ∈ RG++.
In the early part of the paper, the set G and the associated commodity
space RG will be treated as fixed. Once the demand revelation mechanism
of Section 6 is being considered, however, the trading space of exchangable
commodities is allowed to become the variable set of goods for which a non-
null set of traders claim to have positive endowments.
2.3 Net Trades
For any trader i ∈ I, a typical net trade vector will be denoted by zi ∈ RG,
with components zig for g ∈ G. This vector can be decomposed uniquely as
zi = xi − yi where xi ∈ RG+ and yi ∈ RG+ are separate non-negative demand
and supply vectors with xig = max{zig, 0} and yig = max{−zig, 0} for all g ∈ G.
Using standard lattice notation, one can then write
xi = zi ∨ 0 and yi = −(zi ∧ 0) = (−zi) ∨ 0 (3)
2.4 Feasible Sets
Assume that each trader i ∈ I, given the endowment vector ei ∈ RG+, is able:
1. to supply any non-negative commodity vector yi that belongs to the
supply set Y i := {yi ∈ RG+ | yi 5 ei};
2. to demand any non-negative commodity vector xi that belongs to the
consumption set RG+.
This leads to the closed feasible set Zi := {z ∈ RG+ | z = −ei} = RG+ + {−ei}
of net trade vectors zi = xi − yi with xi ∈ RG+ and yi 5 ei.
Taking into account the resource balance constraint
∑
i∈I x
i 5
∑
i∈I y
i
with free disposal, it follows that one has the following three compact subsets
of the Cartesian product set (RG+)I whose dimension is the product #I ·#G:
1. Y I := {yI ∈ (RG+)I |
∑
i∈I y
i 5
∑
i∈I e
i} of feasible supply allocations ;
2. XI := {xI ∈ (RG+)I |
∑
i∈I x
i 5
∑
i∈I e
i} of feasible demand allocations ;
3. ZI := {zI ∈ XI − Y I | ∑i∈I zi 5 0} of feasible net trade allocations
with free disposal.
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Compactness of these three sets helps guarantee that a Walrasian equilibrium
exists.
2.5 Preferences
Assume that each trader i ∈ I has a continuous, convex, and strictly mono-
tone preference ordering %i over consumption vectors ci ∈ RG+. It is well
known that any such %i can be represented by a continuous quasi-concave
utility function ui : RG+ → R which is strictly increasing. For example, one
can construct
ui(ci) := inf{γ ∈ R | γ 1G %i ci}
3 Formulating an Arrow–Debreu Game
3.1 An Ordinary Market Game
The following reformulation of the Arrow–Debreu abstract economy defines
an ordinary strategic game, rather than a “generalized game” in the sense
of Debreu (1952). In addition to the set of traders i ∈ I, there is one extra
“fictive” player 0 whose role is that of the “Walrasian auctioneer”.
Unlike Debreu’s (1952) generalized game, our game has a non-trivial ex-
tensive form. Specifically, player 0 moves first and chooses a price vector
p ∈ P 0. Each trader i ∈ I then observes this choice of p, which determines
that trader’s endowment constrained budget set
B(p; ei) := {z ∈ RG | z = −ei and p z ≤ 0} (4)
of net trade vectors that are permissible choices for i at the next stage of the
game. Thus, for each trader i ∈ I, a feasible strategy, which we denote by zi,
is a net demand function P 0 3 p 7→ zi(p) ∈ B(p; ei) whose value at each price
p ∈ P 0 is a net trade vector zi ∈ B(p; ei). Hence zi is a selection from trader
i’s endowment constrained budget correspondence P 0 3 p 7→ B(p; ei) ⊂ Zi.
Note that trader i’s feasible strategy set is the Cartesian product
Bi :=
∏
p∈P 0
B(p; ei) (5)
In this game, the typical strategy profile is a combination
(p, zI) ∈ P 0 ×
∏
i∈N
Zi ∈ P 0 × ZI
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of a price vector p ∈ P 0 and a profile zI = (zi)i∈I ∈
∏
i∈IB
i of traders’ net
demand functions. Player 0’s payoff is taken to be
v0(p, zI) := −
∥∥∥∑
i∈I
zi(p)
∥∥∥ = −(∑
g∈G
[∑
i∈I
zig(p)
]2)1/2
(6)
— i.e., minus the Euclidean norm of the aggregate net demand induced by
this strategy profile. Finally, each trader i’s payoff is taken to be
vi(p, zI) := ui(zi(p) + ei) (7)
3.2 The Case of Strictly Convex Preferences
Consider the special case where all traders’ preferences are strictly convex —
or equivalently, when their ordinal utility functions are strictly quasi-concave.
This assumption implies that each trader i ∈ I will have a single-valued
Walrasian net demand function z¯i ∈ Bi in the form of a mapping
P 0 3 p 7→ z¯i(p) ∈ B(p; ei) (8)
satisfying
{z¯i(p)} = arg maxz{ui(z + ei) | z ∈ B(p; ei)} (9)
Then, in the subgame that follows the auctioneer’s choice of any price vector
p ∈ P 0, where each trader i ∈ I is required to choose any net demand vector
zi ∈ B(p; ei), it follows that trader i’s unique dominant strategy is z¯i(p).
With such single-valued net demand functions, the price vector p¯ ∈ P 0 is
a Walrasian equilibrium just in case
∑
i∈I z¯
i(p¯) = 0. Now, applying backward
induction shows that the strategy combination (p¯, z¯I) is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium if and only if:
1. each trader i’s equilibrium strategy z¯i is the Walrasian net demand
function p 7→ z¯i(p) defined by (9);
2. p¯ is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector that, because of (6), gives
player 0 the global maximum payoff v0(p¯, z¯I) = 0.
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3.3 The Case of Demand Correspondences
When trader i’s preferences are not strictly convex, however, there is typically
a Walrasian net demand correspondence or multifunction Z¯i whose set value
is defined by
P 0 3 p 7→ Z(p; Z¯i) := arg maxz{ui(z + ei) | z ∈ B(p; ei)} (10)
Each set value is generally not a singleton.
In this case, a Walrasian equilibrium is a combination (p¯, z¯I) of a price
vector p¯ ∈ P 0 and an allocation or profile z¯I = (zi)i∈I ∈ (RG)I of net
trade vectors, one for each trader i ∈ I, satisfying both ∑i∈I z¯i = 0 and
z¯i ∈ Z(p¯; Z¯i) for all i ∈ I.
Even when they are evaluated at an equilibrium price vector p¯ ∈ P 0,
the typical profile zI of net trade vectors selected from the value z¯I(p¯) ∈∏
i∈I Z(p¯; Z¯
i) of the Cartesian product of traders’ Walrasian net demand
correspondences will fail to satisfy the market clearing requirement that∑
i∈I z
i = 0. For this reason, traders’ realized net demands need to be more
coordinated in order to implement a Walrasian equilibrium as a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.
Indeed, consider any particular Walrasian equilibrium (p¯, z¯I). Following
Myerson (1982) and the discussion in Section 1.4, we allow player 0, who is
a market organizer:
• to announce, as auctioneer, the Walrasian equilibrium price vector p¯;
• to recommend, as principal, that each trader i ∈ I chooses any specific
selection p 7→ zi(p) from the Walrasian net demand correspondence
(10) that satisfies zi(p¯) = z¯i at the chosen equilibrium price vector.
This selects a particular subgame perfect Nash equilibrium which does im-
plement the chosen Walrasian equilibrium (p¯, z¯I).
3.4 Untrustworthy Traders
The game defined in Section 3.1, however, makes the outcome function
depend only on the traders’ profile of net trade vectors z¯I at the equi-
librium price vector p¯ ∈ P 0. These net trades are based on the promise
and the premise that each trader will supply the equilibrium supply vector
y¯i = −(z¯i ∧ 0). Yet no clear incentive for them to do so has been provided.
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Indeed, unlike Shapley and Shubik (1977), as well as many successors, the
game defined in Section 3.1 ignores what commodity vectors traders actually
choose to supply. To overcome this moral hazard problem, we construct an
alternative multi-stage game that incorporates a warehouse system.
4 A Game with Warehousing
4.1 Distinguishing Supply and Demand
Our mechanism with warehousing takes place in several stages. It begins very
like the reformulated Arrow–Debreu game of Section 3.1. The difference is
that we distinguish between supply and demand, and require each trader
i ∈ I to choose what supply vector yi to deposit in a warehouse system.
Only at a later stage is each trader i ∈ I allowed to withdraw a demand
vector xi from the warehouse system.
We therefore consider the multi-stage game that starts as follows:
1. Initially, the auctioneer selects some Walrasian equilibrium price vec-
tor p¯ ∈ P 0, and also recommends an associated mandated Walrasian
equilibrium allocation z¯I of net trade vectors, with associated profiles
x¯I , y¯I ∈ (RG+)I of non-negative mandated warehouse demand vectors
x¯i := z¯i∨0 and supply vectors y¯i = −(z¯i∧0) = (−z¯i)∨0 defined for all
i ∈ I following equation (3). Note that because ei = 0, the feasibility
constraint z¯i = −ei implies that y¯i 5 ei.
2. Next, each trader i ∈ I chooses to deposit in the warehouse system some
supply vector yi ∈ RG+. Because the warehouse manager is told only
to accept the supply of any good up to the limit of what is mandated,
this supply vector is required to satisfy yi 5 y¯i.
4.2 Distinguishing Deviant from Compliant Agents
The moves made in these first two stages of the game determine the two
profiles y¯I and yI of mandated and actual warehouse deposit vectors respec-
tively. These profiles also determine a partition of I into two disjoint subsets
of traders:
• the set
C(yI , y¯I) := {i ∈ I | yi = y¯i} (11)
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of compliant traders, who deliver their mandated supplies, and will be
duly rewarded;
• the complementary set .
D(yI , y¯I) := I \ C(yI , y¯I) = {i ∈ I | yi < y¯i} (12)
of deviant traders, who fail to deliver their mandated supplies, and will
be banished entirely from the warehouse system.
4.3 The Normal Ending of the Game
Suppose that the two supply profiles yI , y¯I ∈ (RG+)I of different traders’ actual
and mandated warehouse supply vectors are equal. Then C(yI , y¯I) = I. In
this case each trader i is allowed to withdraw any commodity vector xi ∈ RG+
satisfying xi 5 x¯i := z¯i ∨ 0. After these withdrawals have been completed,
any remaining surplus is thrown away. This is the end of the game.
4.4 The Abnormal Ending of the Game
Alternatively, suppose that for the pair (yI , y¯I) of warehouse deposit pro-
files, there exists i ∈ I such that yi < y¯i — or equivalently, suppose that
the set D(yI , y¯I) of deviant traders is non-empty. In this case a second-
period allocation submarket is opened, whose outcome depends on (yI , y¯I).
In this submarket, the auctioneer will choose a revised price vector q ∈ P 0 to
clear markets given the already determined available aggregate supply vector∑
i∈I y
i. Moreover, each trader i ∈ I is faced with a second-period budget
constraint q xi ≤ wi(q, yI , y¯I), whose right-hand side is determined by a con-
tinuous wealth distribution rule q 7→ wi(q, yI , y¯I) which also depends on the
mandated as well as the actual warehouse deposit vectors.
Specifically, for each pair yI , y¯I ∈ (RG+)I , the market organizer:
1. first specifies a continuous wealth distribution rule (or WDR)
P 0 3 q 7→ wI(q, yI , y¯I) ∈ RI (13)
as a function of the price vector q that is about to be chosen;
2. given this WDR, specifies some Walrasian equilibrium selection rule
RG × RG 3 (yI , y¯I) 7→ (q˜, x˜I)(yI , y¯I) ∈ P 0 × (RG+)I (14)
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which generates net demand vectors that, for each yI , y¯I ∈ (RG+)I ,
satisfy the market clearing condition∑
i∈I
x˜i(yI , y¯I) =
∑
i∈I
yi (15)
3. allows each trader i to withdraw any demand vector xi ∈ RG+ satis-
fying xi 5 x˜i(yI , y¯I), and then ends the game by throwing away any
outstanding stocks.
4.5 The Second-Period Wealth Distribution Rule
Banishing any deviant trader i ∈ D(yI , y¯I) is equivalent to leaving them with
nothing at all to spend in the second-period market, so
wi(q, yI , y¯I) := 0 if i ∈ D(yI , y¯I)
This draconian sanction is imposed in order to ensure that the income loss
outweighs anything that a deviating trader could possibly gain by manipu-
lating warehouse supplies of one or more goods in an attempt to force the
auctioneer to change prices in a favourable direction.4
Compared to allowing all deviant traders i ∈ D(yI , y¯I) to spend the
market value q yi of what they have actually delivered, this sanction generates
a positive total surplus given by
S(q, yI , y¯I) :=
∑
i∈D(yI ,y¯I)
q yi
This surplus will then be shared equally between all compliant traders i ∈
C(yI , y¯I). It will supplement the value q y¯i at prices q of trader i’s mandated
deliveries to the warehouse system. This implies that any compliant trader
i ∈ C(yI , y¯I), for whom yi = y¯i by definition, is allowed to spend the amount
wi(q, yI , y¯I) := q yi +
1
#C(yI , y¯I)
∑
h∈D(yI ,y¯I)
q yh (16)
Overall, therefore, we define the second-period WDR by
wi(q, yI , y¯I) :=
q yi +
1
#C(yI , y¯I)
∑
h∈D(yI ,y¯I) q y
h if yi = y¯i
0 if yi < y¯i
(17)
4Many thanks to John Geanakoplos for emphasizing the importance of this point.
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Note that if yi = y¯i, then #C(yI , y¯I) ≥ 1, so wi(q, yI , y¯I) is always well-
defined. Summing equations (17) over i ∈ I shows that this WDR satisfies∑
i∈I
wi(q, yI , y¯I) =
∑
i∈C(yI ,y¯I)
wi(q, yI , y¯I) ≤
∑
i∈I
q yi (18)
with equality except in the degenerate case when C(yI , y¯I) = ∅ and so
wi(q, yI , y¯I) = 0 for all i ∈ I. In this degenerate case, all traders are ex-
cluded from the warehouse, whose entire contents are then discarded. In the
non-degenerate case, reaching an equilibrium allocation in the second-period
market system will allow the warehouse to be emptied.
4.6 Second-Period Walrasian Equilibrium
For each fixed pair (yI , y¯I) ∈ (RG+)I × (RG+)I , the mapping q 7→ wi(q, yI , y¯I)
whose value is defined by (17) is always continuous in the price vector q. So
a variation of the usual existence argument shows that there is a Walrasian
equilibrium in this second-period submarket. We assume that the auction-
eer/principal uses an arbitrary selection rule to choose a mapping
(yI , y¯I) 7→ (q(yI , y¯I), x˜I(yI , y¯I)) (19)
whose value is always a Walrasian equilibrium with an allocation x˜I(yI , y¯I)
of warehouse withdrawal vectors that satisfies the market clearing condition
(15).
For notational simplicity, we extend the domain of the mapping defined
by (19) to include pairs of profiles (yI , y¯I) ∈ (RG+)I× (RG+)I satisfying yI = y¯I
or equivalently C(yI , y¯I) = I. Note that then equation (17) specifies that
the second period WDR must satisfy∑
i∈I
wi(q, yI , y¯I) = q
∑
i∈I
yi = q
∑
i∈I
y¯i = q
∑
i∈I
x¯i (20)
This allows us to specify that the value of the mapping (19) at (yI , y¯I) should
be given by q(yI , y¯I) = p¯ and x˜I(yI , y¯I) = x¯I .
4.7 A Second-Period Mechanism
To convert this second-period submarket, with its selected Walrasian equilib-
rium, into a strategic mechanism, with its corresponding Nash equilibrium,
we modify the first-period mechanism of Section 4.1. Specifically, following
each pair of profiles (yI , y¯I) ∈ (RG+)I × (RG+)I :
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1. At the start of the second period, the market organizer applies the
selection rule (19) in order to determine a Walrasian equilibrium with
price vector q˜(yI , y¯I) ∈ P 0 and associated demand allocation x˜I(yI , y¯I).
2. Subsequently, each trader i ∈ I withdraws from the warehouse a com-
modity vector xi ∈ RG+ satisfying xi 5 x˜i(yI , y¯I); the game ceases
when these withdrawals have been completed and any remaining stocks
thrown away.
Because preferences are assumed to be strictly monotone, these rules
evidently imply that withdrawing the full allowance x˜i(yI , y¯I) is a strictly
dominant strategy for each trader i ∈ I in the subgame that follows the
principal’s choice (q˜(yI , y¯I), x˜I(yI , y¯I) of Walrasian equilibrium.
4.8 First-Period Payoffs and Dominant Strategies
Looking back to the first period, recall our postulate that the auction-
eer/principal chooses a particular Walrasian equilibrium
(p¯, x¯I , y¯I) ∈ P 0 × (RG+)I × (RG+)I (21)
for the exchange economy. After the auctioneer/principal has made this
choice, consider the payoff function yI 7→ vi(yI) of each trader i ∈ I in the
ensuing first-period subgame where:
1. each player i ∈ I has a strategy space consisting of warehouse deposit
vectors satisfying 0 5 yi 5 y¯i;
2. thereafter the economy continues on to the second-period Walrasian
equilibrium q(yI , y¯I), x˜I(yI , y¯I) specified by (19) as the outcome of the
ensuing second-period subgame.
The rules devised in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 to determine this second-period
Walrasian equilibrium imply that this payoff function satisfies
vi(yI) =
{
ui(ei − yi + x˜i(yI , y¯I)) if yi = y¯i
ui(ei − yi) if yi 6= y¯i (22)
with x˜i(yI , y¯I) = x¯i in case yI = y¯I . Because preferences are strictly increas-
ing, while both x¯i and x˜i(yI , y¯I) are non-negative, it follows that whenever
yi < y¯i one has
vi(yI) = ui(ei − yi) ≤ ui(ei − yi + x˜i(yI , y¯I)) = vi(y¯i, yI\{i}) (23)
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with strict inequality except in the special case when x˜i(y¯i, yI\{i}, y¯I) = 0.
Hence the minimal compliant strategy yi = y¯i is player i’s unique best re-
sponse in this first-period game to any strategy profile yI\{i} chosen by the
other players.
4.9 Subgame Perfect Dominant Strategies
Consider the two-stage strategic market game defined in this section. Sup-
pose that the auctioneer/principal is committed to choose both:
1. the first-stage mandated Walrasian equilibrium (p¯, x¯I , y¯I), as described
in Section 4.1;
2. for each profile yI of actual warehouse supply vectors, and given the
profile y¯I of mandated warehouse supply vectors that was determined in
the first period, the second-stage Walrasian equilibrium (q, x˜I)(yI , y¯I),
as described in Section 4.6.
Conditional on these commitments, all the traders are involved in a two-stage
game where each trader i ∈ I is required to choose:
1. in the first stage, a non-negative warehouse deposit vector satisfying
yi 5 y¯i;
2. in the second stage, in each possible subgame determined by a specific
pair (yI , y¯I) of actual and mandated warehouse supply vectors, a non-
negative warehouse withdrawal vector satisfying xi 5 x˜i(yI , y¯I).
Given the assumption that preferences are strictly monotone, our construc-
tion ensures that each trader i ∈ I has:
1. in the overall two-stage game, a strictly dominant strategy consisting
of:
• the minimal compliant supply strategy in the first stage of de-
positing the mandated amount y¯i into the warehouse system, as
described in Section 4.8;
• followed in every possible second-stage subgame defined by the
pair (yI , y¯I) by the maximal demand strategy of withdrawing the
full amount x˜i(yI , y¯I) allowed to trader i.
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2. within every possible second-stage subgame defined by the pair (yI , y¯I),
a strictly dominant strategy consisting of the same maximal demand
strategy.
In this sense, the strategy profile where every trader pursues this combination
of the minimal compliant supply strategy followed by the maximal demand
strategy is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in subgame perfect strictly
dominant strategies. Of course, it does implement the Walrasian equilibrium
chosen by the market principal.
5 An Economy with Many Traders
5.1 Incomplete Information
In the game set out in Section 3, player 0 as market manager combined
the role of the price-setting Walrasian auctioneer with that of the principal
in a generalized principal/agent model. We now switch focus to the case
when player 0 has incomplete information regarding traders’ preferences and
endowments.
In Section 4, the same player 0 also took on the role of warehouse man-
ager, but with complete information regarding the traders. When there is
incomplete information, we defer until Section 7 any discussion of the incen-
tives needed to encourage traders to deposit their promised supply vectors
in a warehouse.
5.2 Traders and Their Labels
We will be considering strategy-proof trading mechanisms in a setting with
incomplete information. The introduction explained why we need to consider
an economy with many traders. Accordingly, let the set I of actual traders
be N := {1, 2, . . .}, the countably infinite set of natural numbers. There will,
however, be a continuum of potential traders in the form of a non-atomic
probability space (L,L, λ), where L is a topological label space, with L as its
completed Borel σ-algebra — i.e., it contains not only all open sets, but all
subsets of λ-null sets. A prominent example occurs when L is the unit interval
[0, 1] equipped with its Lebesgue σ-algebra L and its Lebesgue measure λ.
Now each trader i ∈ I will be given a random label `i chosen from a
non-atomic probability space (L,L, λ). This random labelling embeds an
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economy with a countable set of traders into the standard notion of a con-
tinuum economy with L as the set of potential traders. In this continuum
economy, there is an actual trader labelled ` if and only if the label ` happens
to equal one of the countable random draws from (L,L, λ).
5.3 Traders’ Types
To accommodate incomplete information we follow Harsanyi (1967–8) in as-
suming that traders’ payoff functions depend on their respective hidden per-
sonal types, known only to themselves. Actually, unlike in Harsanyi’s formu-
lation, in Sections 7 and 8 traders will also have hidden endowments, and so
feasible sets of net trade vectors that depend on hidden variables.
Specifically, assume first that each trader i’s utility function RG+ 3 ci 7→
ui(ci) ∈ R, which was introduced in Section 2.5, takes the form ui(ci) ≡
u(ci; θi) for a taste parameter θi belonging to a type space Θ, where the
mapping
RG+ ×Θ 3 (c, θ) 7→ u(c; θ) ∈ R (24)
is independent of i, as well as jointly continuous and strictly increasing in c
for each fixed θ. Quasi-concavity, however, will not be required for existence
of Walrasian equilibrium in our economy with an infinite set of traders.
Second, define the rectangular set E¯ = {e ∈ RG+ | e 5 e¯} for a suitable
upper bound satisfying e¯  0. This strict inequality loses no generality
provided that we exclude from the commodity set G those goods g for which
e¯g = 0.
We will take the space of possible endowment vectors e to be the set
E := E¯ \ {0} = {e ∈ RG+ | 0 < e 5 e¯} (25)
This implicitly excludes any trader whose endowment vector is zero, and who
therefore plays no role in any Walrasian exchange.
Finally, the traders’ type space is taken to be the Cartesian product
space T = Θ × E, whose members are hidden preference–endowment pairs
t = (θ, e).
5.4 A Statistical Continuum Economy
Let Mλ(L;T ) denote the family of probability measures τ on the product
measurable space (L × T,B(L × T )) of label–type pairs with the property
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that the marginal measure induced by τ on the component space L equals
the specified measure λ. That is, for every Borel subset B in L, one has
τ(B×T ) = λ(B). A statistical continuum economy is defined as a probability
measure or type distribution τ ∈Mλ(L;T ).
Given any Borel set B ⊆ L × T and any label ` ∈ L, define the section
B` := {t ∈ T | (`, t) ∈ B} of B. Then, as discussed in Appendix 1, the
requirement that margL τ = λ is equivalent to the existence of a stochastic
transition or measure disintegration in the form of a measurable mapping
L 3 ` 7→ τ` ∈M(T ) which is also the regular conditional probability measure
that satisfies τ(B) =
∫
L
τ`(B`)λ(d`) for every Borel set B ⊆ L × T . In
Appendix 1 it is also shown that, because λ is non-atomic, so is τ .
Thus, in the end our economy will have the countable set I = N of actual
traders, whose labels (`i)i∈N are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables drawn
from the probability space (L,L, λ). Moreover, it is assumed that there exists
a probability measure τ ∈Mλ(L;T ) such that the actual traders’ label–type
pairs (`i, ti)i∈N are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
variables drawn from the product probability space (L × T,B(L × T ), τ).
Then each label–type pair (`, t) ∈ L×T can be regarded as a potential trader,
whose existence as an actual trader depends on whether (`, t) is included in
the set {(`i, ti) | i ∈ N} of random draws. Because τ is non-atomic, the
probability space (L × T,B(L × T ), τ) can be regarded as a continuum of
potential traders.
5.5 The Statistical Economy as Limit
Given any label–type pair (`, t) ∈ L × T , let δ(`,t) denote the degenerate
Borel probability measure defined on the space B(L×T ) of Borel measurable
subsets of L× T which, for every Borel set B ⊂ L× T , satisfies
δ(`,t)(B) :=
{
1 if (`, t) ∈ B
0 if (`, t) 6∈ B (26)
For each infinite sequence (`N, tN) = (`k, tk)k∈N of label–type pairs in L× T ,
and for each n ∈ N, let
τn(`
N, tN) :=
1
n
∑n
k=1
δ(`k,θk) (27)
denote the empirical measure on Borel subsets of L × T generated by the
label–type pairs of the finite subset of traders {1, 2, . . . , n}. That is, by (26)
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and (27), the empirical measure of each Borel set B ⊂ L× T satisfies
τn(`
N, tN)(B) =
1
n
∑n
k=1
δ(`k,θk)(B) =
1
n
#{k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} | (`k, θk) ∈ B}
(28)
This requires τn(`
N, tN)(B) to equal the proportion of the set of n pairs
{(`k, tk) | k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}} that belong to B.
Because both L and T are compact Polish spaces, so is L× T given any
natural metric. Equip the space M(L × T ) of joint probability measures
with its topology of weak convergence of probability measures, along with
the associated Borel σ-algebra; this makesM(L×T ) a compact Polish space
as well. Recall the assumption that the sequence (`N, tN) = (`k, tk)k∈N of
label–type pairs results from infinitely many i.i.d. random draws from the
common probability space (L×T,B(L×T ), τ). As discussed in Appendix 1,
this assumption enables the Glivenko–Cantelli theorem to be applied; it tells
us that for τ∞-a.e. sequence (`N, tN), in this weak convergence topology the
empirical measure τn → τ as n→∞.
Moreover, definition (27) implies that the marginal empirical measure
over the measurable label space (L,L) satisfies
margL τn =
1
n
∑n
k=1
margL δ(`k,θk) =
1
n
∑n
k=1
δ`k (29)
Applying the Glivenko–Cantelli theorem to the left-hand side of (29) estab-
lishes that margL τn → margL τ for λ∞-a.e. sequence `N, whereas applying it
to the right-hand side establishes that 1
n
∑n
k=1 δ`k → λ for λ∞-a.e. sequence
`N. So these limits must be equal, from which it follows that margL τ = λ
and so τ ∈Mλ(L;T ).
This convergence property enables us to interpret the statistical contin-
uum economy with a continuum of potential traders (`, t) ∈ L × T as an
appropriate limit of an economy with a countable set of traders k ∈ N whose
label–type pairs (`k, tk)k∈N are i.i.d. random draws from a joint probability
measure τ ∈Mλ(L;T ) over L× T whose marginal on L is λ.
5.6 Statistical Strategy Measures
Consider a trading game of incomplete information in which a market or-
ganizer confronts a finite set I of traders. Each trader chooses a strategy
belonging to a common strategy or action set A that takes the form of a
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Polish space. Then it is natural to consider the entire domain of strategy
profiles
I × T 3 (i, t) = (i, θ, e) 7→ ai,t ∈ A
determining, as a function of their respective individual type t ∈ T , the
strategy of each trader i ∈ I.
We focus on the extension to a countably infinite set of traders whose
label–type pairs form the sequence (`N, tN) of independent random draws
from the probability measure τ over Borel subsets of L× T . In this case, it
seems natural at first to extend this notion of strategy profile to mappings
L× T 3 (`, t) = (`, θ, e) 7→ a`,t ∈ A
Yet the space AL×T of all these mapping includes many that are not measur-
able w.r.t. any convenient σ-algebra on L×T . Instead of mappings in AL×T ,
therefore, we focus on statistics that the market organizer could estimate, at
least in principle.
Indeed, suppose first that the market organizer were able to observe not
only the traders’ labels ` ∈ L and actions a ∈ A, but also their hidden types
t ∈ T . Then it is assumed that the market organizer’s estimated distribution
of triples (`, t, a) ∈ L×T ×A takes the form of a statistical strategy measure
αS in the spaceMτ (L×T ;A) of joint probability measures on L×T×A whose
marginal distribution margL×T α
S on the component subspace L×T of label–
type pairs equals the exogenously specified joint measure τ ∈ Mλ(L;T ). In
effect, we assume that:
1. not only does infinite sequence (`N, tN) ∈ (L × T )N of actual traders’
label–type pairs consist of i.i.d. random draws from a joint probability
measure τ ∈Mλ(L;T ) over potential traders’ label–type pairs;
2. but there also exists a joint probability measure αS ∈ Mτ (L × T ;A)
over potential traders’ triples (`, t, a) having the property that, when
the actual traders’ observable actions ak ∈ A are appended to their
label–type pairs (`k, tk), the resulting infinite sequence (`N, tN, aN) of
triples (`k, tk, ak) consists of i.i.d. random draws from the distribution
αS over L× T × A.
An unnecessarily strong sufficient condition for the measure αS to ex-
ist can be specified, following the results of Hammond and Sun (2008). It
requires that there exist:
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1. a probability space (Ω,F , P );
2. a measurable mapping L×T 3 (`, t) 7→ pi`,t ∈M(A) from the space of
label–type pairs (`, t) to the domain of probability measures, or equiv-
alently of mixed strategies, on A;
3. a random process
L× T × Ω 3 (`, t, ω) 7→ α`,t(ω) ∈ A
in which the random variables Ω 3 ω 7→ α`,t(ω) are independent, like
independently mixed strategies, with respective marginal distributions
pi`,t.
Under this assumption, the measure αS not only describes the joint distri-
bution of the the continuum of potential agents’ triples (`, t, a) ∈ L×T ×A.
Relative to the product probability measure (αS)N on the Borel product σ-
algebra of the infinite Cartesian product space (L×T×A)N of triple sequences
(`N, tN, aN), it almost surely also describes the distribution of the list of actual
agents’ triples.
The market organizer, however, cannot observe any trader’s type. So we
assume that its decisions are based on the estimated marginal distribution
α = margL×A α
S ∈Mλ(L;A) of observable label–action pairs (`, a) ∈ L×A.
A similar formulation will appear repeatedly in the subsequent analysis.
6 A Demand Revelation Mechanism
6.1 The Exchangeable Commodity Set
In our demand revelation (or DR) game, there will be one market orga-
nizer who confronts a countably infinite set of agents whose label–type pairs
(`k, tk)k∈N are i.i.d. random draws from the non-atomic probability measure
τ ∈ Mλ(L;T ) over the Borel subsets of the Cartesian product set L × T of
potential agents’ label–type pairs.
For demand revelation to succeed in reaching a Walrasian equilibrium,
that equilibrium must exist. To ensure that it does, it is important to avoid
the difficulty created by Arrow’s (1951) exceptional case, especially in the
later versions considered by Koopmans (1957) and many others, including
Hammond (2011). This difficulty can be attributed to the misguided attempt
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to create a market for a good g ∈ G even when no trader has any endowment
of g, so g can never be traded.
Accordingly, the demand revelation game will start by having each actual
trader with the label–type pair (`, t) ∈ L × T announce an endowment set
H`,t ⊆ G of commodities that the trader claims to be able to supply in
positive amounts. All the actual traders’ announcements are assumed to
give rise to an estimated statistical strategy measure γ ∈ Mλ(L; 2G) over
observable pairs (`,H) ∈ L × 2G of potential agents’ labels and associated
endowment sets, where 2G denotes the power set of all subsets of the finite
set G of potentially exchangeable commodities.
For each g ∈ G, define the set
2Gg := {H ∈ 2G | g ∈ H}
of subsets of G that contain the particular good g. Based on each possible
estimated measure γ, let
G(γ) := {g ∈ G | γ(L× {H ∈ 2G | g ∈ H}) > 0} (30)
denote the trading set of those commodities which a non-null set of potential
traders have included in their announced endowment set. Often this set will
be denoted simply by K. In case #K < 2, essentially no trade is possible;
so we assume from now on that #K ≥ 2.
The demand revelation mechanism we construct will ignore all essentially
non-exchangeable commodities outside the set K := G(γ). Accordingly,
given K, define the trading space RK , as well as the new price simplex
PK :=
{
p ∈ RK+ |
∑
g∈G(γ)
pg = 1
}
(31)
with relative interior
P 0K :=
{
p ∈ RK++ |
∑
g∈G(γ)
pg = 1
}
(32)
and relative boundary bdPK := PK \ P 0K .
6.2 Regular Demands
Once the set K := G(γ) of exchangeable commodities has been determined,
the budget correspondence of any trader is defined by the mapping
P 0K 3 p 7→ BK(p) := {z ∈ RK | p z ≤ 0} (33)
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Then a possible net demand correspondence will be a mapping
P 0K 3 p 7→ Z(p;Z) ⊂ BK(p) (34)
also denoted by Z, that selects a non-empty subset Z(p;Z) of the budget set
BK(p) for each exchangeable goods price vector p ∈ P 0K .
Given the trading set K := G(γ), we may as well replace each trader’s
announced endowment set H ⊂ G by the effective endowment set defined as
the intersection J := H ∩K.
Recall that in (25) of Section 5.3 we introduced the notation e¯ ∈ RG++
for the uniform upper bound on traders’ endowment vectors. Given any
announced effective endowment set J ⊆ K, define e¯J := (e¯)g∈J ∈ RJ+ as
the subvector of e¯ that results from considering only goods g ∈ J , and
(e¯J , 0K\J) ∈ RK+ as the vector that results after replacing by zero all the
components (e¯g)g∈K\J corresponding to the other goods. Similarly, for each
price vector p = (pg)g∈K ∈ PK , one can define the vector pJ = (pg)g∈J of
associated components.
Definition 1. Given the trading set K and the announced endowment set
H ⊆ G whose intersection with K is J , a net demand correspondence Z
given by (34) is said to be J-regular just in case it satisfies the following four
conditions:
1. budget exhaustion: p z = 0 for all p ∈ P 0K and all z ∈ Z(p;Z);
2. feasibility: z = −(e¯J , 0K\J) for all p ∈ P 0K and for all z ∈ Z(p;Z);
3. continuity: the correspondence Z has a graph
ΓZ := {(p, z) ∈ P 0K × RK | z ∈ Z(p;Z)} (35)
which is a relatively closed subset of P 0K × RK;
4. boundary condition: Suppose that (pN, zN) = (pn, zn)n∈N ∈ P 0K × RK
is any infinite sequence of points in the graph ΓZ of Z defined by (35)
with the property that the price sequence pN converges to a point p¯ on
the boundary of PK satisfying p¯
J 6= 0J — i.e., p¯j > 0 for at least one
j ∈ J . Then the sum ∑g∈K zng → +∞.
The feasibility condition 2 implies that the trader cannot offer to sup-
ply any commodity that has not been included in the effective announced
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endowment set J . The boundary condition 4 requires that, as one or more
prices tend to zero, so total net demand over all commodities g ∈ K tends
to infinity whenever the “cheaper point” property holds — i.e., whenever at
least one of commodities in the effective announced endowment subset J has
a positive price in the limit.
We remark that if the set J is replaced by the larger set J˜ ) J , then the
feasibility condition 2 is less restrictive because zg can be negative for g ∈
J˜ \J . On the other hand, the boundary condition is more restrictive because
more components of any limit price vector p¯ can be non-zero, implying that
total net demand over all commodities g ∈ K tends to infinity for more price
sequences that converge to the boundary of the price simplex PK .
Note in particular that J-regularity does not require any revealed prefer-
ence axiom or other rationality condition to be satisfied. Given any trading
space K ⊆ G and any endowment set J ⊆ K, let ZKJ denote the set of all J-
regular net demand correspondences Z. Then each Z ∈ ZKJ can be identified
uniquely by its graph ΓZ, and so by continuity, with an appropriate subset
of the family of all relatively closed subsets of P 0K ×RK — or more precisely,
of the set {(p, z) ∈ P 0K × RK | z = −(e¯J , 0G\J)}.
Finally, given the probability measure γ ∈ Mτ (L; 2G) and the trading
space K := G(γ) defined by (30), let
ZK :=
⋃
J⊆K
ZKJ (36)
denote the domain of all net demand correspondences that are J-regular for
some endowment set J ⊆ K.
6.3 A Statistical Demand Revelation Mechanism
We will now define a two-stage demand revelation mechanism.
1. At the first stage, each trader with label ` ∈ L reports an endowment
set H ⊆ G. Moreover, following the discussion in Section 5.6, the
traders’ reports are assumed to determine an estimated distribution
γ ∈ Mλ(L; 2G), and so a trading set K = G(γ) ⊆ G defined by (30),
which is announced to each trader.
2. At the second stage, given the trading set K = G(γ) defined by (30),
each trader who has been recorded as having the pair (`,H) ∈ L×2G is
next asked to report a J-regular net demand correspondence Z ∈ ZKJ ,
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where J = H ∩ K ∈ 2K . Based on the list of all traders’ recorded
triples (`, J,Z), the market organizer is assumed to estimate the demand
distribution ζ ∈ Mγ(L × 2K ;ZK) which, by definition, satisfies the
extra regularity condition
ζ({(`, J,Z) ∈ L× 2K ×ZK | Z ∈ ZKJ }) = 1 (37)
In the following, for each distribution γ ∈ Mλ(L; 2G) with associated
trading set K = G(γ), let M∗γ denote the subset of probability measures ζ
over triples (`, J,Z) belonging to Mγ(L× 2K ;ZK) that satisfy (37).
Given the trading set K ∈ 2G, player 0’s task in the role of market
organizer will be to devise a statistical demand revelation (or DR) mechanism
that, for each estimated demand distribution ζ satisfying (37), selects: (a) a
price vector p¯(ζ) ∈ P 0K ; and (b) a measurable allocation function
L× 2K ×ZK 3 (`, J,Z) 7→ z¯`(J,Z; ζ) ∈ RK (38)
that together constitute a market equilibrium satisfying, by definition:
• throughout the domain L× 2K ×ZK , the selection condition
z¯`(J,Z; ζ) ∈ Z(p¯(ζ);Z) (39)
• the market equilibrium condition
0K =
∫
L×2K×ZK
z¯`(J,Z; ζ) ζ(d`× dJ × dZ) (40)
Discussion of conditions ensuring existence of such a market equilibrium
for each demand distribution ζ is deferred to Appendix 2.
6.4 A Statistical Game of Incomplete Information
The statistical DR mechanism specified in Section 6.3 generates a game of
incomplete information in strategic form with:
1. the probability space (L,L, λ) of potential traders’ labels;
2. the type space T of potential traders’ taste–endowment pairs t =
(θ, e) ∈ Θ× E;
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3. a type distribution in the form of a probability measure τ ∈Mλ(L;T )
over label–type pairs (`, t) ∈ L× T that describe potential traders;
4. for all traders, the common demand revelation strategy space
S :=
⋃
H∈2G
(
{H} ×
∏
K∈2G
ZKH∩K
)
(41)
of pairs s = (H,ZH) which combine:
(a) an announced endowment set H ⊆ G;
(b) an entire profile
ZH = 〈ZK〉K∈2G ∈
∏
K∈2G
ZKH∩K (42)
specifying, for each possible trading set K ⊂ G that the mar-
ket organizer might announce, an associated H ∩ K-regular net
demand correspondence ZK ;
5. for each potential trader with label–type pair (`, t) ∈ L × T , a payoff
function
S×Mλ(L;S) 3 (s, σ) 7→ v`(s, σ; t) (43)
defined for every individual trader’s demand revelation strategy s =
(H,ZH) ∈ S and for every estimated measure σ ∈ Mλ(L;S) over
traders’ label–strategy pairs. Its value is given by
v`(s, σ; t) = v`(H,ZH , σ; t) := u(z¯`(H,ZHK(σ), ζ(σ)) + e; θ) (44)
where:
(a) for the population of all potential traders, K(σ) := G(γ(σ)) de-
notes the trading set induced by the relevant marginal distribution
γ(σ) := marg2G σ of the strategy measure σ;
(b) given the demand set H that the trader has already announced,
ZHH∩K(σ) is the H ∩K(σ)-regular net demand correspondence that
forms the appropriate component of the profile ZH defined by (42);
(c) for the population of all potential traders, ζ(σ) ∈ M∗γ(σ) denotes
the induced estimated demand distribution ζ over the set L ×
2G×Z of all observable triples (`,H,Z) which, for every Borel set
V ⊂ L× 2G ×ZK(σ), satisfies
ζ(σ)(V ) := σ({(`,H,ZH) ∈ L×S | (`,H,ZHH∩K(σ)) ∈ V }) (45)
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6.5 Walrasian Demand Revelation Strategies
Definition 2. A trader whose true type is t = (θ, e) has a non-empty true
endowment set H(e) := {g ∈ G | eg > 0}, as well as for each trading space
K ⊆ G:
1. a true budget correspondence
P 0K 3 p 7→ BK(p; e) := {z ∈ RK | z = −(eJ , 0K\J) and p z ≤ 0} (46)
where J denotes the set H(e) ∩K = {g ∈ K | eg > 0}, whereas 0K\J
denotes the zero vector in RK\J , and eJ = (eg)g∈J ∈ RJ .
2. a true Walrasian net demand correspondence ZˆK,t : P
0
K→ RK defined
by
P 0K 3 p 7→ Z(p; ZˆK,t) := arg maxz{u(z + e; θ) | z ∈ BK(p; e)} (47)
Let
sˆ := (H(e), ZˆH(e)) = (H(e), 〈ZˆK,t〉K∈2G) (48)
denote this trader’s (truthful) Walrasian demand revelation strategy.
By definitions (31) and (32), the domain P 0K excludes boundary points of
the price simplex PK . By the definition of J as {g ∈ K | eg > 0}, one has
eJ ∈ RJ++, so a standard argument based on the cheaper point lemma shows
that this net demand correspondence is upper hemi-continuous.
In Appendix 2 it is shown that, provided that preferences are continuous
and strictly monotone, the true Walrasian net demand correspondence ZˆK,t
also satisfies the boundary condition. Hence ZˆK,t is J-regular according to
the definition in Section 6.2.
6.6 Strategyproofness
For any actual trader whose true label–type pair is (`, t) ∈ L×T , consider any
change to the demand revelation strategy s that this trader may choose from
the strategy set S defined by (41). Now, the measures γ, σ and ζ(σ) defined
in Sections 6.1 and 6.4 all have a marginal distribution on L equal to the non-
atomic measure λ. It follows from the argument at the end of Appendix 1
that all these three measures are also non-atomic. So this change in one
trader’s demand revelation strategy s ∈ S has no effect on:
29
1. the estimated endowment distribution γ ∈Mλ(L; 2G);
2. the associated trading space K = G(γ) ⊆ G defined by (30);
3. the estimated demand distribution ζ(σ) ∈M∗γ given by (45);
4. the associated Walrasian price vector p¯(ζ) ∈ RK specified in Section
6.3.
Accordingly, given this announcement strategy s = (H, 〈ZHH∩K)〉K∈2G) ∈ S as
well as the trading space K = G(γ) ⊆ G and the associated endowment set
J = H∩K, whatever net demand vector z¯`(J,Z; ζ) ∈ Z(p¯(ζ);Z) is assigned to
this trader by the demand selection specified in (39), it must belong to the
value Z(p¯(ζ);Z`,t) of the announced J-regular net demand correspondence
Z`,t ∈ ZKJ at the particular price p¯(ζ), and so to the associated budget set
BK(p¯(ζ)) specified in (33).
Now, for this trader with true label–type pair (`, t) ∈ L × T , any net
demand vector z¯`(ZˆK,t, ζ) that is selected from the true Walrasian demand
set Z(p; ZˆK,t) must, by definition, be one of the most preferred among the net
trade vectors in the budget set B(p¯(ζ); e). In particular it must be weakly
preferred to the alternative net demand vector z¯`(Z`,t, ζ). It follows that, no
matter what the demand distribution ζ may be, this trader weakly prefers
the truthful Walrasian demand revelation strategy sˆ ∈ S to any allowed
alternative s ∈ S. Moreover, when the alternative z¯`(Z`,t, ζ) does not belong
to Z(p; ZˆK,t), this preference is strict.
In this sense, truthfulness is always at least a weakly dominant strategy.
So the demand revelation mechanism is indeed at least weakly strategyproof.
Thus, in our limit economy with infinitely many traders, the market orga-
nizer can set up a demand revelation game in order to implement Walrasian
equilibrium with a strategyproof mechanism.
Nevertheless, the objection raised in Section 3.4 still applies. Consider
any trader with true label–type pair (`, t) ∈ L×T , true endowment set J and
true Walrasian net demand correspondence ZˆK,t as specified in Section 6.5.
So far, no incentive has been provided for that trader to deliver the supply
vector y`(J, ZˆK,t, ζ) = −(z¯`(J, ZˆK,t, ζ) ∧ 0) required to reach a Walrasian
allocation.
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7 Demand Revelation with Warehousing
7.1 Traders’ Warehouse Supplies
The task now is to devise incentives for each potential trader with label–
type pair (`, t) = (`, θ, e) ∈ L × T not only to announce both the true
endowment set H(e) ∈ 2G and true demand correspondence, but also to
deliver the mandated supply vector to the warehouse system. To do so,
we shall extend the DR mechanism of Section 6 into the kind of two-stage
setting introduced in Section 4.1. Indeed, the estimated demand distribution
ζ = margL×Z σ ∈ M∗γ given by (45) is used in order to determine, for each
potential agent described by the recorded triple (`, J,Z) ∈ L × 2K × ZK ,
where J = H ∩K, a mandated supply vector defined by
y¯`(J,Z; ζ) := −(z¯`(J,Z; ζ) ∧ 0) (49)
This vector plays a key role in determining the outcome of the second-
stage market mechanism. For each recorded triple (`, J,Z) ∈ L×2K×ZK , any
corresponding actual agent is allowed to bring to the warehouse system any
supply vector yS ∈ RK+ satisfying yS 5 e. This vector will not be accepted,
however. Indeed, oversupplies are not allowed, so the accepted supply vector
is y := yS ∧ y¯`(J,Z; ζ). This exclusion makes it impossible for any trader to
speculate that any good they oversupply could be bought back more cheaply
in the second-stage market.5
These supply vectors that the actual traders choose to bring to the ware-
house are assumed to determine a new strategic supply distribution in the
form of an estimated joint probability measure
η ∈Mζ(L× 2K ×ZK ;RG+) (50)
over the space L × 2K × ZK × RG+ of all recorded quadruples (`, J,Z, y)
of labels, endowment sets, demand correspondences, and warehouse supply
vectors; this measure is assumed to be consistent with the appropriate first-
stage demand distribution ζ.
5My thanks to Michael Wickens for encouraging me to emphasize this point.
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7.2 Distinguishing Deviant from Compliant Agents
As in the corresponding mechanism with full information that was considered
in Section 4, the conclusion of the mechanism with incomplete information
distinguishes between:
compliant traders for whom y = y¯`(J,Z; ζ);
deviant traders for whom y < y¯`(J,Z; ζ).
Now, the normal compliant case occurs when, for the given joint distri-
bution η of demand correspondences and warehouse supply vectors, almost
all traders are compliant — i.e.,
η({(`, J,Z, y) ∈ L× 2K ×ZK × RG+ | y = y¯`(J,Z; ζ)}) = 1 (51)
In this case:
1. any compliant trader is allowed to withdraw any commodity vector
x ∈ RG+ satisfying x 5 x¯`(J,Z; ζ) := z¯`(J,Z; ζ) ∨ 0;
2. any deviant trader is allowed to withdraw any commodity vector x ∈
RG+ satisfying the budget constraint p(ζ)x ≤ p(ζ) y, where p(ζ) y <
p(ζ) y¯`(J,Z; ζ) because p(ζ) 0 and y < y¯`(J,Z; ζ).
The game ceases when all traders have completed their withdrawals, and any
remaining stock in the warehouse has been thrown away.
7.3 Warehouse Supplies as Endowments
In the alternative deviant case when (51) is violated, there will be a non-
negligible and observable discrepancy between:
• on the one hand, the measure η generated by the actual warehouse
deposits;
• on the other hand, the function (`, J,Z) 7→ y¯`(J,Z; ζ) specifying man-
dated warehouse deposits.
Indeed, let
Eη[y] :=
∫
L×2G×Z×RG+
y η(d`× dJ × dZ× dy) (52)
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denote the available mean warehouse supply vector per head, and let
Eζ [x¯`(J,Z; ζ)] = Eζ [y¯`(J,Z; ζ)] :=
∫
L×2G×Z
y¯`(J,Z; ζ) ζ(d`× dJ × dZ) (53)
denote the mean warehouse demand vector per head. Because y < y¯`(J,Z; ζ)
on a non-negligible set, one has Eη[y] < Eζ [x¯`(J,Z; ζ)] — i.e., when aggre-
gated over all traders, whether actual or potential, the mean supply is almost
surely insufficient to meet the mean demand.
In order to deal with this discrepancy, and to deter the failures to de-
liver the mandated warehouse deposits that must have occurred, the market
organizer will institute a new second-stage demand revelation mechanism.
At the beginning of this second stage, each potential trader is described by
the combination (`, t, J,Z, y) of a label ` ∈ L, a type t = (θ, e) ∈ T , a
recorded endowment set J ∈ 2K , a recorded net demand correspondence
Z ∈ ZKJ , and the trader’s chosen warehouse supply vector y ∈ RG+. The en-
dowment vector e is no longer relevant, however, because no trader is allowed
to deposit any more of any good into the warehouse system. Instead, the
pre-determined supply vector y is treated as an endowment, even though it
has already been delivered to the warehouse system. Each trader, however,
can choose how much of the effective endowment y to reclaim for personal
consumption, depending on the second-period price vector.
7.4 A Second-Stage Commodity Space
The second-stage demand revelation mechanism will work with the restricted
trading space
G+(η) := {g ∈ G | Eη[yg] > 0} (54)
consisting of commodities for which the mean warehouse deposit per trader is
positive. At the second stage, trade will take place only in these commodities;
traders’ warehouse deposits yg of all other goods g ∈ K \G+(η) are returned
in their entirety to their depositors, in order to ensure that no trader ever
loses from making those deposits.
From now on, therefore, we consider the commodity space RG+(η), as well
as the new version
Q :=
{
q ∈ RG+(η)+ |
∑
g∈G
qg = 1
}
(55)
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of the unit simplex P ⊂ RG of semi-positive normalized price vectors defined
by (1) of Section 2.1, together with the new version
Q0 :=
{
q ∈ RG+(η)++ |
∑
g∈G
qg = 1
}
(56)
of the relative interior P 0 ⊂ P defined by (2).
For each supply vector y = 〈yg〉g∈K ∈ RK+ that a trader might supply, we
introduce the notation
y+ := 〈yg〉g∈G+(η) ∈ RG
+(η)
+ (57)
for the subvector whose components correspond to goods that the trader
supplies in positive amounts.
7.5 Second-Stage Regular Demands
As the second stage starts, each actual trader has a record in the form of a
quadruple (`, J,Z, y+) that combines an observable label ` ∈ L, a reported
endowment set H ∈ 2G such that J = H ∩ K, a reported J-regular net
demand correspondence Z ∈ ZKJ , and a chosen warehouse supply vector
y+ ∈ RG+(η)+ defined by (57) for those commodities g ∈ G+(η) that will
be traded at the second stage. For each price vector q ∈ Q0, the trader’s
associated budget set of permissible demand vectors x+ in the trading space
RG+(η) is taken to be
BX(q; y
+, η) := {x+ ∈ RG+(η)+ | q x+ ≤ q y+} (58)
For each price vector q ∈ Q0, this limits the trader’s allowable expenditure
q x+ on warehouse deliveries x+ ∈ RG+(η)+ to the value q y+ of the trader’s
own recorded warehouse supply vector.
Let z+ := x+ − y+ ∈ RG+(η) denote the trader’s second-stage net trade
vector. For each price vector q ∈ Q0, the budget set (58) can then be
expressed in the equivalent form
B+(q; y+, η) := {z+ ∈ RG+(η) | z+ = −y+ and q z+ ≤ 0} (59)
This is obviously analogous to the first-stage budget set defined by (33) in
Section 6.2.
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Given the supply vector y+ ∈ RG+(η)+ , let
J(y+) := {g ∈ G+(η) | y+g > 0} (60)
denote the set of goods that are supplied in positive amounts. Then let Z+y+
denote the set of all J(y+)-regular net demand correspondences Z+. These
are multifunctions
Q0 3 q 7→ Z+(q;Z+) ⊆ B+(q; y+, η) ⊂ RG+(η) (61)
which satisfy the budget exhaustion, feasibiity, continuity, and boundary
conditions set out in Section 6.2, but with the commodity set K replaced by
G+(η), and with the endowment set J replaced by J(y+).
Given the vector e¯ of upper bounds specified in (25), as well as the supply
distribution η, let e¯+ := (e¯g)g∈G+(η) ∈ RG+(η) denote the vector of uniform
upper bounds on traders’ endowments, restricted to the set G+(η) of goods
to be traded at the second stage. Because each trader’s warehouse deposit
vector y must satisfy the feasibility constraint y 5 e 5 e¯, it follows that the
restriction y+ = (yg)g∈G+(η) ∈ RG+(η) must satisfy y+ 5 e¯+. Accordingly, let
Z+ := ∪05y+5e¯+Z+y+ (62)
denote the domain of all regular net demand correspondences Z+ — i.e.,
all net demand correspondences Z+ that are y+-regular for some feasible
y+ 5 e¯+.
7.6 A Second-Stage Demand Revelation Mechanism
As the second stage starts, player 0 has a record for each actual trader
taking the form of a quadruple (`, J,Z, y) that combines an observable label
` ∈ L, a reported endowment set J ∈ 2K , a reported J-regular net demand
correspondence Z ∈ ZKJ , and a supply vector y ∈ RG+. Furthermore, as in
(50), player 0 has already used all these records in order to estimate the
supply distribution η over these quadruples.
We now specify a second-stage DR mechanism along the lines of the first-
stage DR mechanism set out in Section 7.1. Specifically:
1. First, player 0 as statistician uses definitions (54) and (57) to compute
the set G+(η) of commodities to be traded, as well as the restriction
y+ ∈ RG+(η)+ of each trader’s chosen warehouse supply vector y ∈ RK
to the subset G+(η) of commodities g ∈ G.
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2. Each trader with recorded quadruple (`, J,Z, y+) is required to report
to player 0 a J(y+)-regular second-stage net demand correspondence
Q0 3 q 7→ Z+(q) ∈ RG+(η), or Z+ ∈ Z+.
3. To each trader’s previous record (`, J,Z, y) ∈ L × 2K × ZK × RG+,
player 0 appends the reported second-stage net demand correspondence
Z+ ∈ Z+, thus forming the quintuple (`, J,Z, y,Z+).
4. Based on all the quintuples recorded at the previous step, player 0
estimates the joint distribution ζ+ ∈ Mη(L × 2K × ZK × RG+;Z+).
Regularity of each trader’s announced net demand correspondence im-
plies that ζ+ must satisfy the additional restriction
ζ+({(`, J,Z, y,Z+) ∈ L× 2K ×Z × RG+ ×Z+ | Z+ ∈ Z+y+}) = 1 (63)
5. Depending on the distribution ζ+ ∈Mη(L× 2K ×ZK ×RG+;Z+) that
was estimated at Step 4, player 0 determines both a second-stage price
vector q¯(ζ+) and a second-stage allocation in the form of an integrable
function
L×2K×ZK×RG+ 3 (`, J,Z, y,Z+) 7→ z˜`(J,Z, y,Z+; ζ+) ∈ RG
+(η) (64)
that together satisfy:
(a) the selection condition
z˜`(J,Z, y,Z+; ζ+) ∈ Z+(q(ζ+);Z+) ⊆ RG+(η)
for ζ+-a.e. (`, J,Z, y,Z+) ∈ L× 2K ×Z × RG+ ×Z+ (65)
(b) the market clearing condition
0 =
∫
L×2K×Z×RG+×Z+
z˜`(J,Z, y,Z+; ζ+) ζ+(d`×dJ×dZ×dy×dZ+)
(66)
6. Each trader with the recorded quintuple (`, J,Z, y,Z+) is allowed to
claim from the warehouse any commodity vector x+ ∈ RG+(η)+ satisfying
x+ 5 x˜`(J,Z, y,Z+; ζ+), where
x˜`(J,Z, y,Z+; ζ+) := z˜`(J,Z, y,Z+; ζ+) + y+ (67)
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denotes the demand allowance corresponding to the assigned net trade
vector; the game ceases when all traders have made their withdrawals
within their specified limit, after which player 0 disposes of any remain-
ing surplus.
For each second-stage demand distribution ζ+ in the relevant domain
Mη(L × 2K × Z × RG+;Z+), the existence theorem of Appendix 3 can be
applied to show that there is a price vector q˜(ζ+) ∈ Q0 and allocation function
which together satisfy both (65) and (66).
8 A Twenty-Two Step Mechanism
8.1 Defining the Extensive Form Game
The discussion so far has sketched an extensive form game6 whose players
are:
• the countably infinite set of traders k ∈ N whose respective label–type
pairs (`k, tk) ∈ L × T are independently drawn from the probability
measure τ ∈Mλ(L;T );
• player 0, who manages the market by combining all five roles of record-
ing clerk, statistician, auctioneer, principal, and warehouse manager.
This game can be set out in full detail using the following twenty-two steps:
1. Player 0 announces a finite set G of all possible goods that are candi-
dates for trade.
2. Successive traders numbered k = 1, 2, . . . appear in turn before player 0,
and signal their intention to participate in the market by reporting
a non-empty endowment set Hk ⊆ G, whereupon each is assigned a
random label `k drawn independently from the constant probability
measure λ on L.
3. Player 0 as clerk records the countably infinite list of all reported pairs
(`k, Hk) ∈ L× 2G.
6Strictly speaking, according to the usual definition of an extensive form game, players
are allowed to move only one at a time. Our formulation follows Dubey and Kaneko (1984)
and others in allowing many players to move simultaneously.
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4. Player 0 as statistician estimates the joint endowment distribution γ ∈
Mλ(L; 2G) of all the pairs (`,H) ∈ L×2G that were recorded at Step 3.
5. Given the endowment distribution γ that was estimated at Step 4,
player 0, now acting as market manager:
(a) constructs for each good g ∈ G the set
Lg := {(`,H) ∈ L× 2G | g ∈ H} (68)
of pairs where the endowment set H includes good g;
(b) calculates and then publicly announces the trading set
K := G(γ) := {g ∈ G | γ(Lg) > 0} (69)
6. Each trader with record (`,H) ∈ L× 2G, who therefore faces the rele-
vant trading set J := H ∩K, is required by player 0 to report a first-
stage J-regular net demand correspondence Z ∈ ZKJ . Any trader with
record (`,H) who refuses to report such a correspondence is penalized
by being recorded as having the autarkic net demand correspondence
Zaut that satisfies Z(p,Zaut) = {0K} for all p ∈ P 0K .
7. Player 0, acting as clerk, updates each trader’s pair (`,H) ∈ L × 2G
that was recorded at Step 3 by:
• first replacing H with J := H ∩K;
• then appending to (`,H) the same trader’s net demand correspon-
dence Z ∈ ZKJ .
The resulting new record is a triple (`, J,Z) ∈ L× 2K ×ZK .
8. Player 0, acting as statistician, estimates the joint distribution ζ ∈M∗γ
of all the triples (`, J,Z) ∈ L × 2K × ZK recorded at Step 7. Because
of Step 6, this distribution must satisfy the regularity condition (37).
9. Conditional on the demand distribution ζ that was estimated at Step 8,
player 0, acting as market equilibrator, determines:
(a) a first-stage price vector p¯(ζ) ∈ P 0K ;
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(b) an allocation in the form of an integrable selection
L× 2K ×ZK 3 (`, J,Z) 7→ z¯`(J,Z; ζ) ∈ Z(p¯(ζ);Z) ⊂ RK
from the J-regular demand correspondences announced at Step 6.
These two must satisfy the market clearing condition (40).
10. Player 0, acting as warehouse manager, opens up the warehouse to
accept traders’ deposits, and then, as each trader arrives at the ware-
house, player 0, acting as clerk:
(a) consults each trader’s triple (`, J,Z) ∈ L × 2K × ZK that was
recorded at Step 6;
(b) uses the allocation found at Step 9(b) in order to calculate and
then announce to each trader the mandated warehouse supply
vector
y¯`(J,Z; ζ) := −[z¯`(J,Z; ζ) ∧ 0] ∈ RK+
11. Each trader described by with endowment vector e together with the
triple (`, J,Z) recorded at Step 7 brings to the warehouse any supply
vector yS ∈ RK+ satisfying yS 5 e.
12. Player 0, acting as warehouse manager, when confronted by a trader
who is described by the triple (`, J,Z) recorded at Step 7, and who
at Step 11 brings the supply yS to the warehouse, accepts the vector
y := yS ∧ y¯`(J,Z; ζ).
13. Player 0, acting as clerk, appends the supply vector y accepted at Step
12 to the triple (`, J,Z) recorded at Step 7, so the trader’s updated
record takes the form of a quadruple
(`, J,Z, y) ∈ L× 2K ×ZK × RG+
14. Player 0, acting as statistician, uses the list of all the quadruples
(`, J,Z, y) that were recorded at step 13 in order to estimate:
(a) the corresponding supply distribution η ∈Mζ(L×2K ×ZK ;RG+);
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(b) the measure η(C(ζ)) of the set
C(ζ) := {(`, J,Z, y) ∈ L× 2K ×ZK × RG+ | y = y¯`(J,Z; ζ)} (70)
of all compliant quadruples (`, J,Z, y).
15. Consider first the compliant case when η(C(ζ)) = 1. Here, player 0
acting as warehouse manager allows each trader with the quadruple
(`, J,Z, y) that was recorded at Step 13 to withdraw any demand vector
x = 0 satisfying:
(a) in case (`, J,Z, y) is a compliant quadruple in C, the rationing
constraint x 5 x¯`(J,Z; ζ) := [z¯`(J,Z; ζ)∨0] ∈ RG+, where z¯`(J,Z; ζ)
is specified at Step 9 ;
(b) in case (`, J,Z, y) is a deviant quadruple outside C, the budget
constraint p¯(ζ)x ≤ p¯(ζ) y, where p¯(ζ) is the market-clearing price
in P 0 that was chosen at Step 8.
In this case where almost all traders are compliant, player 0 follows this
Step 15 by jumping directly to the concluding Step 22 of the game.
16. Alternatively, in the deviant case when η(C) < 1, player 0 constructs
the set G+(η) defined by (54) of goods g ∈ K whose mean supply per
trader is positive, thus allowing good g to be traded in the second-stage
market. If the number of such goods satisfies #G+(η) < 2, then trade
is impossible. Therefore in this case player 0 returns each deposit of
every good to its depositor, and declares that there is autarky.
Otherwise, if #G+(η) ≥ 2, then player 0:
• announces the set G+(η);
• returns any deposits of goods g ∈ G \G+(η) to the depositors;
• starting at Step 17, institutes a second-stage demand revelation
mechanism like that specified in Section 7.6.
17. Each trader, given the already recorded deposit vector y+ ∈ RG+(η)+ , is
required to report to player 0 a J(y+)-regular second-stage net demand
correspondence Q0 3 q 7→ Z+(q) ∈ RG+(η), or Z+ ∈ Z+.
Any trader with recorded quadruple (`, J,Z, y+) who fails to report such
a net demand correspondence is recorded as having the autarkic net
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demand correspondence (Z+)aut that satisfies Z+(q, (Z+)aut) = {0G+(η)}
for all q ∈ Q0.
18. Player 0, acting as clerk, updates each trader’s quadruple (`, J,Z, y) ∈
L×2K×ZK×RG+ that was recorded at Step 13 by appending the same
trader’s second-stage net demand correspondence Z+ ∈ Z+ that was
recorded at Step 17, thus extending the trader’s record to the quintuple
(`, J,Z, y,Z+) ∈ L× 2K ×ZK × RG ×Z+.
19. Given all the quintuples (`, J,Z, y,Z+) ∈ L× 2K ×ZK ×RG+×Z+ that
were recorded at Step 18, player 0 acting as statistician estimates the
associated demand distribution ζ+ ∈Mη(L× 2K ×ZK × RG+;Z+).
20. Given the distribution ζ+ estimated at step 19, player 0, acting as
market equilibrator, next determines:
(a) a second-stage price vector q˜(ζ+) ∈ Q0;
(b) from the J(y+)-regular demand correspondences announced at
Step 18, a measurable selection specified by (65), which also sat-
isfies the market clearing condition (66).
21. Each trader with the quintuple (`, J,Z, y,Z+) that was recorded at Step
18, and so with the second-stage net trade vector z˜`(Z, ζ, y,Z+; ζ+) that
was specified in Step 20, is allowed to withdraw from the warehouse
any demand vector x+ = 0 which satisfies x+ 5 x˜`(J,Z, y,Z+; ζ+) for
the allowance specified by (67).
22. When all traders have made their allowed withdrawals, player 0 dis-
poses of any remaining surplus.
8.2 Two Rounds of Eliminating Dominated Strategies
Following the discussion in Section 4.9 for the case of an economy with com-
plete information and a finite number of traders, suppose that player 0, as a
market manageer who combines the roles of auctioneer, principal and ware-
house manager, is committed to a specified sequence of actions at Steps
1, 3–5, 7–10, 12–16, 18–20, and 22 of the extensive form game set out in
Section 8.1. Conditional upon these commitments, there is a game of in-
complete information with a countably infinite set of traders who must all
41
select a five-part strategy. The first three parts specify the trader’s moves at
Steps 2, 6, 11. Furthermore, in case the spot market needs to re-open after
a non-negligible set of traders have failed to deliver at Step 11 the supply
vectors which player 0 had mandated at Step 10, there are two extra parts
that specify the trader’s moves at Steps 17 and 21 of the extensive form
continuation game that arises in this “non-compliant” case.
This extensive form game will be analysed using backward recursion,
starting at the penultimate Step 21. There, because preferences are as-
sumed to be strictly monotone, the obvious strictly dominant strategy for
each trader is to withdraw the full allowance x˜`(J, ζ+,Z, ζ, y,Z+) defined by
(67).
Next, working backwards to the demand revelation mechanism at Step
17, we recognize that by then each trader’s endowment has effectively become
the vector y+ ∈ RG+(η)+ which has already been deposited in the warehouse
system. Then the argument in Section 6.6 shows that revealing one’s true
Walrasian demand correspondence is a weakly dominant strategy.
8.3 The Warehouse Supply Subgame: Strategies
Moving further backwards through the extensive form game between all the
traders, we come next to the key Step 11, which is reached after:
1. all the traders have already announced both endowment sets H at
Step 2 and net demand correspondences Z at Step 6;
2. these announcements have been recorded as Step 7 and then used at
Step 8 in order to estimate the demand measure ζ ∈M∗γ;
3. each trader with the recorded triple (`, J,Z) ∈ L × 2K × ZK , where
J = H ∩ K, has been informed at Step 10 of both the mandated
demand vector x¯`(J,Z; ζ) and the mandated supply vector y¯`(J,Z; ζ).
At Step 11, as already explained in Section 8.2, using backward recursion
to eliminate dominated strategies leaves each trader with only the strategy
of truthfully revealing their Walrasian net demand correspondence at Step
17, and then of withdrawing all they are allowed at Step 21. So, given the
history ζ that player 0 estimates at Step 8, as well as the key variables that
player 0 specifies at Steps 9 and 10, the traders at Step 11 are confronted
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with a one-shot continuation game of incomplete information, denoted by
G(ζ), for which we now determine the strategy sets and payoff functions.
In this game G(ζ), each trader’s full description involves the recorded
triple (`, J,Z) ∈ L × 2K × ZK supplemented by the hidden type t = (θ, e).
Though the type remains hidden, the endowment vector e limits what ware-
house supply vector y ∈ RK+ the trader can choose, whereas the mandated
supply vector y¯`(J,Z; ζ) limits what the warehouse manager will accept. Ac-
cordingly, we introduce the notation
y¯`e(J,Z, ζ) := e ∧ y¯`(J,Z; ζ) (71)
for the upper bound on the vector of supplies that the trader can deliver to
the warehouse system, and then
Y `e (J,Z, ζ) := {y ∈ RK+ | y 5 y¯`e(J,Z, ζ)} (72)
for the strategy set of a trader described by the quadruple (`, J, t,Z) with
hidden type t = (θ, e), when the estimated demand measure is ζ. Though
it depends on the hidden endowment e, the constraint y 5 e is obviously
self-enforcing when applied to actual rather than to promised deliveries.
8.4 The Warehouse Supply Subgame: Payoffs
In the game G(ζ) with strategy sets specified by (72), the traders’ choices
at Step 11 of the extensive form game are assumed to determine the supply
distribution η ∈ Mζ(L × 2K × ZK ;RG+) that player 0 estimates at Step
14. The estimated supply distribution η determines player 0’s next choices
at Steps 15 and 16. Hence, each trader’s payoff function in the subgame
G(ζ) depends not only on the trader’s own supply vector y, but also on the
measure η, as well as on the trader’s own hidden type t = (θ, e) and the
previously recorded triple (`, J,Z). Of course, since the measure η is non-
atomic, no trader’s choice of supply vector y can affect it. This leaves two
cases to consider, depending on whether the proportion of compliant agents
satisfies η(C) = 1 or η(C) < 1.
In the compliant case when η(C) = 1, player 0 is committed to follow
Step 15. The typical trader described by the quadruple (`, J, t,Z) has a payoff
that depends then on whether:
• y = y¯`(J,Z; ζ). This is only possible when y¯`(J,Z; ζ) 5 e. Then the
trader is compliant and receives the payoff
w`(y¯`(J,Z; ζ), ζ; θ, e,Z) = u(z¯`(J,Z; ζ) + e; θ) (73)
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from the mandated net demand vector z¯`(J,Z; ζ).
• y < y¯`(J,Z; ζ). Then the trader is deviant and receives the payoff
w`(y, ζ; θ, e,Z) = max
z
{u(z + e; θ) | z = −y¯`(J,Z; ζ) and p(ζ) z ≤ 0}
(74)
But the mandated net demand vector z¯`(J,Z; ζ) solves the maximization
problem in (74) when the constraint z = −y¯`(J,Z; ζ) is replaced by the
constraint z = −e. When the trader is compliant and so y¯`(J,Z; ζ) 5 e, the
constraint z = −e is weaker. Hence
w`(y¯`(J,Z; ζ), ζ; θ, e,Z) ≥ w`(y, ζ; θ, e,Z)
for all y < y¯`(J,Z; ζ). Since this is true for all measures ζ and all compliant η,
it implies that compliance is a weakly dominant strategy in this case.
In the alternative case when η(C(ζ)) < 1, player 0 is committed to follow
Step 16, and to reopen markets for goods g ∈ G+(η). We consider this case
next.
8.5 Dominant Warehouse Supply Strategies
Consider any joint distribution ζ+ ∈ Mη(L × 2K × ZK × RG+;Z+) with
associated price vector q˜(ζ+) that player 0 is committed to choose at Step
20. Each trader’s anticipated payoff in the game G(ζ) will then depend not
only on the trader’s own supply vector y and the measure ζ+, but also on the
trader’s own previously recorded triple (`, J,Z), as well as the hidden type
t = (θ, e). Hence, this trader’s payoff can be written as
w`(y, ζ+; θ, e, J,Z)
:= max
x
{u(x− y + e; θ) | x = 0 and q˜(ζ+)x ≤ q˜(ζ+) y} (75)
Introducing the change of variable z = x − y, with y 5 e fixed, one can
rewrite (75) as
w`(y, ζ+; θ, e, J,Z) = max
z
{u(z + e; θ) | z = −y and q˜(ζ+) z ≤ 0} (76)
Because y¯`(J,Z; ζ) 5 e, we can replace y by y¯`(J,Z; ζ) in (76) to obtain
w`(y¯`(J, J,Z; ζ), ζ+; θ, e, J,Z)
= max
z
{u(z + e; θ) | z = −y¯`(J,Z; ζ) and q˜(ζ+) z ≤ 0} (77)
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But the requirement that y 5 y¯`(J,Z; ζ) implies that the constraint z = −y in
(76) is at least as restrictive as the corresponding constraint z = −y¯`(J,Z; ζ)
in (77). Hence
w`(y, ζ+; θ, e, J,Z) ≤ w`(y¯`(J,Z; ζ), ζ+; θ, e, J,Z) (78)
Recall that the inequality (78) holds for all possible distributions ζ+ ∈
Mη(L× 2K ×ZK × RG+;Z+) that could be estimated at Step 19. It follows
that for any agent described by the triple (`, J,Z) and any measure ζ ∈M∗γ
over such triples, the compliant warehouse supply strategy with y = y¯`(J,Z; ζ)
weakly dominates any alternative y satisfying the requirements that 0 5 y 5
e and y 5 y¯`(J,Z; ζ).
As further intuition for (78), note that supplying any vector y 5 y¯`(J,Z; ζ)
in effect offers the free option to repurchase some of those supplies in case
this is optimal ex post given the price vector q˜(ζ+) that is used to clear the
second submarket. For this reason, among those warehouse supply vectors
that satisfy y 5 y¯`(J,Z; ζ), a larger vector y always weakly dominates any
smaller one.
8.6 Dominant Demand Revelation
A standard argument was provided in Section 6.6 to show that the Walrasian
demand revelation strategy sˆ := (H(e), ZˆH(e)) = (H(e), 〈ZˆK,t〉K∈2G) specified
in (48) is dominant for each trader. That argument presumed that the final
allocation would be a net demand vector in the value of the announced
demand correspondence at the equilibrium price vector chosen by player 0.
In the game being considered here, the situation is somewhat more in-
volved. Nevertheless, after eliminating all weakly dominated strategies for
each trader at Step 21, then Step 17, and finally Step 11, each trader at
Steps 2 and 6 participates in what is equivalent to the game G of demand
revelation that was considered in Section 6. All traders face the common
strategy set S specified in (41). The payoff of each trader with label ` ∈ L
and type t = (θ, e) ∈ T can be expressed as a function
w`(s, ζ; θ, e) = u(x¯`(J,Z; ζ)− y¯`(J,Z; ζ) + e; θ) = u(z¯`(J,Z; ζ) + e; θ) (79)
of their own strategy s ∈ S, as well as of the joint distribution ζ ∈ M∗γ of
observable triples (`, J,Z). The right-hand side, of course, is exactly the same
as in (44) provided that one takes J = K(σ), Z = ZHK(σ), and ζ = ζ(σ). So
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the truthful Walrasian demand revelation strategy sˆ given by (48) remains
the unique weakly dominant strategy in the game G.
8.7 Subgame Perfect Bayesian Strategyproofness
To summarize, for each trader described by the triple (`, θ, e) ∈ L × T , one
now has the following results.
• The assumption of strictly monotone preferences implies that, in the
continuation game that arises after the market organizer has com-
pleted Step 20 and specified the maximum possible withdrawal vector
z˜`(J,Z, y,Z+;µ) for this trader, at Step 21 the maximal demand strategy
of withdrawing this full amount is strictly dominant.
• In the continuation game that arises after the market organizer has
completed Step 16 and announced that markets have to reopen, a
weakly dominant strategy for the trader at Step 17 is to announce
the true Walrasian demand correspondence Z+ ∈ Z+, followed by the
above full withdrawal strategy at Step 21.
• In the continuation game that arises at Step 11, after the market or-
ganizer has completed Step 10 and announced the trader’s mandated
warehouse supply vector y¯`(J, z, ζ), the trader’s unique dominant strat-
egy is endowment constrained compliance. That is, the supply strategy
is to deposit the vector y¯`e(J,Z, ζ) defined by (71). This is followed by
the above continuation strategy starting at Step 18.
• At Step 6 of the game, when the trader is called upon to announce
a first-stage regular net demand correspondence Z ∈ Z`, a weakly
dominant strategy is to announce the true Walrasian net demand cor-
respondence ZˆK.t given the trader’s true type t, followed by the above
continuation strategy starting at Step 11.
• At Step 2 of the game, when the trader is called upon to announce an
endowment set H ⊆ G, a weakly dominant strategy is to announce the
true endowment set H(e), followed by the above continuation strategy
starting at Step 5.
In this sense, for our twenty-two step game in extensive form, a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in unique subgame perfect dominant or weakly
dominant strategies consists of the strategy profile where every trader:
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1. starts by revealing the true endowment set;
2. then reveals the true Walrasian net demand correspondence;
3. then, follows the minimal compliant supply strategy in choosing a ware-
house deposit;
4. then, if markets need to reopen, reveals the new true Walrasian net
demand correspondence given what was supplied at the previous stage;
5. finally, withdraws as much from the warehouse as player 0 allows.
Of course, this strategy profile does implement the Walrasian equilibium
desired by player 0 who combines the five roles of auctioneer, clerk, statis-
tician, principal, and warehouse manager. In every second-stage submarket,
our mechanism also allows an amended Walrasian equilibrium to be reached
with unique dominant or weakly dominant strategies of demand revelation
and warehouse withdrawal.
Finally, following the analysis in Hammond (1987, 2011) as well as Gues-
nerie (1998), we note that the demand revelation mechanisms built around
Steps 6 and 17 are multilaterally strategy proof in the sense that, for each
finite coalition C ⊂ L × T , there is no combination of misreported demand
correspondences and hidden trades on the side that makes every member of C
better off.
9 Concluding Remarks
The analysis has been limited to a static system of spot markets, in which
many competing traders interact with an omnipotent principal who may have
no information regarding traders’ preferences or endowments. Demand reve-
lation allows Walrasian equilibrium to be reached, at least in principle, pro-
vided that one makes no concessions to computational limitations. In prac-
tice, a demand revelation process could require traders to submit a trading
algorithm. This could take the form of an approved menu of standard algo-
rithms which differ from each other depending on a variable high-dimensional
parameter vector that the trader can choose.
When traders cannot trust each other to fulfil supply contracts, perhaps
because endowments can be hidden and consumed away from the market,
one also needs a warehouse system, along with a procedure for deterring
defaulters.
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9.1 Production
It would be routine to allow each agent to choose production activities at
any combination of the following three stages:
1. before supplies are deposited in the warehouse;
2. after supplies have been deposited in the warehouse, but before de-
mands are withdrawn;
3. after demands have been withdrawn.
It should also be routine to allow the warehouse deposits to be used as inputs
in a production process that generates new outputs available for withdrawal.
That would allow a system of local warehouses, between which goods can be
transported at some cost.
9.2 Other Possible Extensions
Much bigger challenges are posed by:
• Financial markets, of even the simplest kind, in a two-period riskless
economy with a pure credit market. Any such financial market poses
the problem of enforcing promises to repay loans which cannot be se-
cured by warehouse deposits, because some second-period commodities
may not even exist in the first period. Using durable goods as collat-
eral for loans can help alleviate these moral hazard issues, but cannot
obviate them entirely.
• Labour markets, where unless employers and employees trust each other
to some extent, it seems difficult to ensure subgame perfect strate-
gyproofness without some form of coercive contract enforcement.
• Public goods financed by taxation, aggregate non-convexities in pro-
duction, insurance markets with adverse selection, etc.
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Appendix 1: Probability in Polish Spaces
Polish Spaces
Definition 3. A topological space (U,U) is:
1. separable just in case U is the closure in U of a countable subset of U ;
2. metrizable just in case there is a metric d : U × U → R+ such that U
is generated by the family B(u) := {v ∈ U | d(v, u) < } of open balls,
as u varies over U and  varies over positive reals.
3. completely metrizable if it is metrizable by a metric which makes the
space U complete in the sense that each Cauchy sequence converges.7
A space is Polish just in case it is separable and completely metrizable.
It is easy to check that the topological product (U1 ×U2,U1 ⊗U2) of two
Polish spaces (U1,U1) and (U2,U2) is also Polish.
The Glivenko–Cantelli Theorem
Let (U, d) be any separable metric space, and let α be any probability measure
on its Borel σ-algebra. Let αN denote the infinite product measure on the
collection UN of countably many copies of (U, d), equipped with its product
σ-algebra.
For each infinite sequence uN = (uk)k∈N ∈ UN and for each n ∈ N, let
αn(u
N) :=
1
n
∑n
k=1
δuk (80)
denote the empirical measure on U which is generated by the first n elements
{u1, u2, . . . , un} of the sequence uN. The Glivenko–Cantelli theorem can be
stated as follows:
Theorem 1. Let (U, d) be any separable metric space, and α be any probabil-
ity measure on its Borel σ-algebra. Then, for αN-a.e. uN ∈ UN, the empirical
measure αn(u
N) defined by (80) converges weakly to α.
7An infinite sequence uN = (un)n∈N of points un ∈ U is a Cauchy sequence just in case,
for each  > 0, there exists n ∈ N such that, whenever both m > n and n > n, then one
has d(um, un) < .
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Following Parthasarathy (1968), whose work builds on that of Varada-
rajan (1958), the theorem can be seen as the implication of two prior results.
First, for every Borel set B ⊆ U , apply the (strong) law of large numbers
to the random variables defined by the indicator function U 3 u 7→ 1B(u) ∈
{0, 1}. It implies that there exists an exceptional set NB ⊂ UN of sequences
uN such that αN(NB) = 0 and, unless u
N ∈ NB, one has
αn(u
N)(B) =
1
n
∑n
k=1
1B(u
k)→ α(B) (81)
Second, because the metric space (U, d) is separable, there is a countable
collection vN = {vk}k∈N of points vk ∈ U such that the Borel σ-algebra of
(U, d) is generated by the countable collection
B(vN) :=
⋃
{Br(vk) | (k, r) ∈ N×Q+}
of open balls Br(v
k) as k varies over N and the radius r varies over the set Q+
of positive rational numbers. For each (k, r) ∈ N × Q+, let Nkr denote the
exceptional set of sequences uN with the property that αn(u
N)(Br(v
k)) 6→
α(Br(v
k)) as n → ∞. It follows that αn(uN)(B) → α(B) for all Borel
sets B ∈ B(vN) simultaneously except when uN belongs to the αN-null set
∪k∈N ∪r∈Q+ Nkr. It can then be shown that this convergence of measures on
the countable collection B(vN) implies weak convergence.
Stochastic Transitions
Starting in Section 5.4, the paper considers many spaces such as Mλ(L;T ),
defined as the set of all probability measures τ on the product measurable
space (L × T,B(L × T )) whose marginal measure margL τ on L equals the
fixed measure λ — i.e., τ(K × T ) = λ(K) for every Borel set K ⊆ L
For every Borel set B ⊆ L×T and every ` ∈ L, let B` denote the section
{t ∈ T | (`, t) ∈ B} of B.
Definition 4. A stochastic transition or measure disintegration of a proba-
bility measure τ ∈ M(L × T ), which is also a regular conditional probabil-
ity measure, is defined uniquely for λ-a.e. ` ∈ L as a measurable mapping
L 3 ` 7→ τ` ∈M(T ) that, for every Borel set B ⊆ L× T , satisfies
τ(B) =
∫
L
τ`(B`)λ(d`) (82)
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Given any Borel set K ⊆ L, applying (82) to the Borel set K × T gives
τ(K × T ) = ∫
L
τ`((K × T )`)λ(d`). But the sections (K × T )` of the set
K × T evidently satisfy (K × T )` = T in case ` ∈ K, but (K × T )` = ∅ in
case ` 6∈ K. This obviously implies that τ(K × T ) = ∫
K
τ`(T )λ(d`) = λ(K).
Since this is true for all Borel sets K ⊆ L, one has margL τ = λ.
Conversely, given any fixed Borel set F ⊆ T , consider the function
L 3 B 7→ λF (B) := τ(B × F )
It is easy to see that this defines λF as a Borel measure on L. Moreover,
λF (B) = τ(B × F ) ≤ τ(B × T ) = λ(B)
for all Borel sets B ⊆ L, and so λ(B) = 0 =⇒ λF (B) = 0. It follows that the
measure λF is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the measure λ. So there exists
a Radon–Nikodym derivative in the form of a Borel measurable mapping
L 3 ` 7→ EF (`) with the property that τ(B × F ) = λF (B) =
∫
B
EF (`)λ(d`)
for all Borel B ⊆ L.
Consider now the σ-algebra L ⊗ {∅, T} formed from the product of the
σ-algebra L on L with the trivial σ-algebra {∅, T} on T . Note that any
function L × T 3 (`, t) 7→ f(`, t) is L ⊗ {∅, T} measurable if and only if
there is an L measurable function L 3 ` 7→ g(`) such that f(`, t) = g(`),
independent of t, for λ-a.e. ` ∈ L.
After taking account of important technical details, it can now be shown
that for each fixed Borel set F ⊆ T , the mapping L 3 ` 7→ EF (`) corresponds
to a version of the L ⊗ {∅, T}-measurable mapping
L× T 3 (`, t) 7→ Eτ [1L×F (`, t)|L ⊗ {∅, T}](`, t)
that determines the conditional expectation given this product σ-algebra of
the indicator function L × T 3 (`, t) 7→ 1L×F (`, t) ∈ {0, 1} defined by the
requirement that its value is 1 iff (`, t) ∈ L × F , or equivalently, iff t ∈ F .
It can now be shown that for each fixed `, the mapping F 7→ EF (`) is a
conditional probability measure P(·|`) on the Borel subsets of T . Moreover,
the mapping ` 7→ EF (`) can be made L-measurable for each Borel set F ⊂ T
in a way which ensures that τ(B) =
∫
L
EB`(`)λ(d`) for all Borel B ⊂ L×T .
This implies that the mapping L × T 3 (`, F ) 7→ EF (`) is a version of a
stochastic transition L× T 3 (`, F ) 7→ τ`(F ) := EF (`) that satisfies (82).
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Extended Probability Measures Are Non-Atomic
Suppose that τ ∈ Mλ(L;T ) and let L 3 ` 7→ EF (`) be any stochastic
transition satisfying (82). Let B be any Borel subset of L × T for which
τ(B) > 0. Define the set J := {` ∈ L | τ`(B`) > 0}. Then (82) implies that,
because τ(B) > 0, one must have λ(J) > 0. Now, we have assumed that the
probability measure λ is non-atomic. So there exists a measurable subset H
of J such that 0 < λ(H) < λ(J). Then the partition of J into the pairwise
disjoint subsets H and J \H induces a corresponding partition of B into the
pairwise disjoint subsets A := (H × T ) ∩ B and B \ A = [(J \H)× T ] ∩ B,
whose respective probabilities satisfy
τ(A) =
∫
H
τ`(B`)λ(d`) > 0 and τ(B \ A) =
∫
J\H
τ`(B`)λ(d`) > 0
It follows that 0 < τ(A) < τ(B). This proves that τ , like λ, is non-atomic.
Appendix 2: Regular Demands
True Walrasian Demands Are Regular
Let K = G(γ) ⊆ G denote the trading set. Consider an individual trader
with endowment vector e ∈ RK+ and so the effective trading set J = {g ∈ K |
eg > 0}. Let
P JK := {p ∈ PK | pJ > 0J} (83)
denote the subset of the price simplex in RK where at least one good g ∈ J
has a positive price. For the effective trading set J , a J-regular net de-
mand correspondence was defined in Section 6.2 as a multifunction P 0K 3
p 7→ Z(p;Z) ⊂ RK satisfying:
(i) [budget exhaustion] p z = 0 for all p ∈ P 0K and all z ∈ Z(p;Z).
(ii) [feasibility]: z = −(e¯J , 0K\J) for all p ∈ P 0K and for all z ∈ Z(p;Z).
(iii) [continuity]: The correspondence Z has a graph
ΓZ := {(p, z) ∈ P 0K × RK | z ∈ Z(p;Z)} (84)
which is a relatively closed subset of P 0K × RK .
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(iv) [boundary condition]: If the infinite sequence (pn, zn)n∈N in ΓZ is such
that pn converges to a point p¯ on the boundary of P JK , then the sum∑
g∈K z
n
g → +∞.
Lemma 1. Let e ∈ RK be any endowment vector satisfying e 5 e¯, let J :=
{g ∈ K | eg > 0} denote the associated endowment set, and let % be any
preference relation on RG+ that is continuous and strictly monotone. Define
the extended Walrasian budget correspondence
P JK 3 p 7→ BJ(p; e) := {z ∈ RK | z = −e and p z ≤ 0} (85)
along with the extended Walrasian net demand correspondence
P JK 3 p 7→ ZJ(p; e) := {z ∈ BJ(p; e)
| (z˜, eG\K)  (z, eG\K) =⇒ p z˜ > 0} (86)
with graph
ΓJ := {(p, z) ∈ P JK × RK | z ∈ ZJ(p; e)} (87)
Then:
1. ZJ(p; e) = ∅ if p ∈ bdPK = PK \ P 0K;
2. ΓJ is a relatively closed subset of P JK × RK;
3. the restriction Z of p 7→ ZJ(p; e) to the subdomain P 0K is a J-regular
net demand correspondence.
Proof. (i) If z ∈ BJ(p; e) with p z < 0, then there exists z˜  z satisfying
p z˜ < 0. Monotonicity implies that z˜  z, and so z 6∈ ZJ(p; e). The
contrapositive implies the budget exhaustion condition requiring that
p z = 0 for every z ∈ ZJ(p; e).
(ii) The feasibility condition is an obvious implication of (86).
(iii) Suppose that (pn, zn)n∈N is a sequence of points in ΓJ which converges
to a limit (p¯, z¯) with p¯ ∈ P JK . Then the definitions (86) and (85) evi-
dently imply that z¯ ∈ BJ(p¯; e). Also, because of the budget exhaustion
property (i) that we have already demonstrated, one has pn zn = 0 for
all n ∈ N. Taking the limits as n→∞, it follows that p¯ z¯ = 0.
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Consider any net trade vector z˜ = −e satisfying z˜  z¯. For any scalar
γ ∈ (0, 1), define the convex combination
zγ := γ z˜ + (1− γ)(−e) (88)
Continuity of preferences now implies that: (a) there exists a scalar
γ ∈ (0, 1) such that zγ  z¯; (b) zγ  zn for all large n ∈ N. Because
(pn, zn) ∈ ΓJ for all n ∈ N, combining the definition (86) with budget
exhaustion implies that pn z
γ > 0 = pn zn for all large n ∈ N. Taking
the limit as n → ∞ implies that p¯ zγ ≥ 0 = p¯ z¯. By hypothesis one
has eJ  0J and also p¯ ∈ P JK , implying that p¯J > 0J and so p¯J eJ > 0.
Because in addition p¯ z¯ = 0, it follows that p¯(z¯ + e) > 0 and also,
because of the definition (88), that
γ p¯(z˜ − z¯) = p¯[zγ − (1− γ)(−e)− γ z¯] ≥ (1− γ)p¯(z¯ + e) > 0
Hence p¯ z˜ > 0.
Finally, since this argument holds for every z˜ % z¯, definition (86) im-
plies that z¯ ∈ Z∗(p¯; e). This proves that ΓJ is a relatively closed subset
of P JK × RK , and also that ΓZ defined by (84) is a relatively closed
subset of P 0K × RK .
(iv) Suppose that (pn, zn)n∈N is any sequence of points in ΓJ with the prop-
erty that (pn)n∈N converges to a limit p¯ on the boundary of P JK . Then
p¯g = 0 for at least one good g ∈ K. Hence, strict monotonicity
of preferences implies that ZJ(p¯; e) = ∅. Because the graph ΓJ of
the correspondence P JK 3 p 7→ ZJ(p; e) is a relatively closed subset of
P JK × RK , it follows that the sequence (zn)n∈N cannot have any limit
point. In particular, it can have no convergent subsequence, and so∑
g∈K |zn,g| → ∞ as n→∞. Because zn = −e for all n ∈ N, it follows
that
∑
g∈K zn,g → +∞ as n→∞.
The Space of Regular Net Demand Correspondences
This section of the appendix uses the abbreviation AB to indicate the fre-
quent page references to the book by Aliprantis and Border (1999).
Let (RK , T ) denote the finite-dimensional Euclidean space RK with its
Euclidean metric topology T . We give an alternative characterization of reg-
ular net demand correspondences using the standard mathematical concept
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of the one-point compactification of (RK , T ) — see AB, p. 56. This is defined
as the topological space (RK∞, T∞) where:
1. the set RK∞ := RK ∪ {∞} is defined by appending to the Euclidean
space RK one extra “point at infinity” denoted by ∞;
2. the topology T∞ is made up of the topology T of RK , together with
the complement RK∞ \ V of each compact subset V ⊂ RK .
Note that each compact subset of (RK , T ) remains a compact subset of
(RK∞, T∞). Note too that (RK , T ) is locally compact, in the sense that ev-
ery point of RK has a compact neighbourhood. It is also separable — i.e.,
the closure of a countable subset, such as the set QK of all points with ra-
tional coordinates. It follows (AB, Corollary 3.33, p. 88) that (RK∞, T∞) is
metrizable. Let d∞ denote any metric. Then (RK∞, d∞) is a compact metric
space.
We now give the price simplex P ⊂ RK the Euclidean metric dP of RK ,
and we give the Cartesian product P × RK∞ the sup metric defined by
d((p, z), (p˜, z˜)) := max{dP (p, p˜), d∞(z, z˜)}
This makes (P × RK∞, d) a compact separable metric space.
Following (36), let ZK denote the set of all net demand correspondences
P 0K 3 p 7→ Z(p) ⊂ RK that are J-regular for some J ⊆ K. We identify each
correspondence Z ∈ ZK with the closure Γ¯Z in the metric space (PK×RK∞, d)
of its graph ΓZ ⊂ P 0K × RK . Because of the boundary condition (iv), this
closure is easily seen to be
Γ¯Z = ΓZ ∪ (bdPK × {∞})
This identification establishes an injection Z 7→ ΓZ from the set ZK into the
space K(PK × RK∞) of compact subsets of the metric space (PK × RK∞, d).
Giving the latter space its Hausdorff metric dH makes (K(P × RK∞, dH) a
Polish space (AB, p. 111). Then we can define the metric dZ on ZK so that
the distance dZ(Z
′,Z′′) between any pair of regular demand correspondences
Z′,Z′′ ∈ ZK equals the Hausdorff distance dH(Γ¯Z′ , Γ¯Z′′) between the closures
of their respective graphs. This construction makes (ZK , dZ) a Polish space.
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Appendix 3: Existence of an Equilibrium Price
Here we prove existence of a market clearing equilibrium in a continuum
economy when there is a well defined measure over the set of regular net de-
mand correspondences. The proof involves extending the arguments of, for
example, Hammond (2011, Section 11, pp. 114–121) from Walrasian demand
correspondences to general upper hemi-continuous demand correspondences
that satisfy the Walrasian budget constraint, without necessarily correspond-
ing to any preference–endowment pair. That proof in turn uses key ideas from
Yamazaki (1978, 1981) and Khan and Yamazaki (1981).
A Sequence of Restricted Price Domains
Let 1K := (1, 1, . . . , 1) denote the vector in RK whose components all equal 1.
For each k ∈ N, define the non-empty price domain
P kK := {p ∈ PK | pg ≥ 1/(#K + k) (all g ∈ K)} (89)
This is a closed subset of the relative interior P 0K of the price simplex P .
Initially k will be treated as fixed. Later, k will be allowed to go to infinity
in order to prove that a Walrasian equilibrium exists.
As in (25) of Section 5.3, assume there is a uniform upper bound e¯ ∈ RK++
on traders’ endowment vectors e ∈ RK+ . For each k ∈ N and p ∈ P 0K , define
the maximal budget set
B¯(p) := {z ∈ RK | z = −e¯ and p z ≤ 0} (90)
Then B¯(p) has the property that the budget set of any trader with endow-
ment e ∈ E satisfies
B(p; e) := {z ∈ RK | z = −e and p z ≤ 0} ⊂ B¯(p) (91)
Note that for any z ∈ B¯(p) and any good g ∈ K, one has
−pg e¯g ≤ pg zg ≤ −
∑
h∈G\{g}
ph zh ≤
∑
h∈G\{g}
ph e¯h (92)
Define the scalar ω := maxg∈K{e¯g}. Because each p ∈ P 0K is normalized to
satisfy
∑
g∈K pg = 1, equation (92) implies that any net trade vector z ∈ B¯(p)
must satisfy
pg zg ≤
∑
h∈K\{g}
ph e¯h ≤
∑
h∈K
ph e¯h ≤
∑
h∈K
ph ω = ω
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and so zg ≤ ω/pg for all g ∈ K. Whenever p ∈ P kK , and so pg ≥ 1/(#K + k)
by definition (89), it follows that zg ≤ ω(#K + k) for all g ∈ K. Hence, any
z ∈ ∪p∈PkKB(p; e) must belong to the bounded convex set
B¯k := {z ∈ RK | z = −e¯ and z 5 ω(#K + k)1K} (93)
So must any z ∈ ∪p∈PkKZ(p;Z), therefore, for any demand correspondence Z
which is regular because, by the definition given in (36), it belongs to the
domain ZK = ∪J⊆KZKJ .
To conclude, regularity of the demand correspondence Z implies that
p 7→ Z(p;Z) restricted to the domain P kK ⊂ P 0K defined by (89) has a graph
ΓZ which is a closed subset of the compact set P
k
K × B¯k, where B¯k is defined
by (93).
A Convergent Sequence of Restricted Fixed Points
Given the fixed probability measure ζ ∈ M∗γ describing the distribution of
regular demand correspondences, define for each k ∈ N and associated re-
stricted price domain P kK the restricted mean excess demand correspondence
P kK 3 p 7→ F k(p) :=
∫
L×2K×ZK
Z(p;Z) ζ(d`× dZ) ⊂ RK (94)
The integral on the right-hand side of (94) exists and is non-empty because
for any price vector p ∈ P kK and any regular demand correspondence Z ∈ Z,
the demand set Z(p;Z) is a non-empty closed subset of the fixed compact set
B¯k. Indeed, by Hildenbrand (1974, p. 73, Prop. 7), the integral is a compact
subset of RK , and actually F k(p) ⊆ B¯k for all p ∈ P kK . It follows from
Hildenbrand (1974, p. 73, Prop. 8) that the graph of p 7→ F k(p) restricted
to P kK is also a closed subset of P
k
K × B¯k.
Because margL ζ = λ and the measure λ is non-atomic, so is each distri-
bution ζ ∈ M∗γ. It follows that each restricted mean excess demand corre-
spondence p 7→ F k(p) is convex-valued.
Next, for each k = 1, 2, . . ., consider the two correspondences
B¯k 3 z 7→ φk(z) := arg maxp{p z | p ∈ P kK} ⊆ P kK
and
P kK × B¯k 3 (p, z) 7→ ψk(p, z) := φk(z)× F k(p) ⊂ P kK × B¯k (95)
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The correspondence defined by (95) has non-empty convex values throughout
a domain P kK × B¯k which is the Cartesian product of two convex sets, so
convex. The graph of ψk is the set
Γψk = {(p, z, p′, z′) ∈ P kK × B¯k × P kK × B¯k | z′ ∈ F k(p) and p′ ∈ φk(z)}
This set is easily seen to be the Cartesian product
Γφk×ΓFk = {(z, p′) ∈ B¯k×P kK | p′ ∈ φk(z)}×{(p, z′) ∈ P kK×B¯k | z′ ∈ F k(p)}
of the graph of φk with the graph of F k, and so compact as the Cartesian
product of two compact sets. Hence, the conditions for Kakutani’s theorem
to hold all apply. For each k = 1, 2, . . ., therefore, the correspondence defined
by (95) has a fixed point, which we denote by (pk,mk) ∈ P kK× B¯k. This fixed
point satisfies (pk,mk) ∈ ψk(pk, zk) and so pk ∈ φk(zk), mk ∈ F k(pk).
Note how, for all p ∈ P kK , the definition of φk, the budget exhaustion
property of regular demand correspondences implies that
pmk ≤ pkmk = 0 (96)
Then, because the vector (#K)−1(1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ P kK for all k ∈ N, this result
and regularity of all the demand correspondences Z ∈ Z together imply that
mk ∈M := {m ∈ RK | m = −e¯ and 1
#K
∑
g∈K
mkg ≤ 0 }
Now, because each fixed point of the sequence (pk,mk)∞k=1 lies in the compact
subset P ×M of RK × RK , there must be a convergent subsequence. Re-
taining only the terms of this subsequence, we can assume that the sequence
(pk,mk)k∈N converges to some limit pair (pˆ, mˆ) ∈ P ×M .
Next, note that any p ∈ P 0K satisfies p ∈ P kK for all large k, so by (96)
the convergent sequence (pk,mk)k∈N of fixed points in P ×M must satisfy
pmk ≤ pkmk = 0 for all k ∈ N. Taking limits as k → ∞ yields p mˆ ≤ 0 for
all p ∈ P 0K , and so
mˆ 5 0 (97)
Positive Prices
Suppose (p˜k)k∈N is an arbitrary infinite sequence of price vectors satisfying
p˜k ∈ P kK for each k ∈ N which converges to a limit p˜ on the boundary of P .
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Let (m˜k)k∈N be an associated sequence of mean net demand vectors satisfying
m˜k ∈ F k(p˜k) for each k ∈ N. Then for each k ∈ N, the definition (94) implies
that there is an integrable selection
L× T 3 (`, t) 7→ z˜`tk ∈ Z(p˜k;Z`,ttk )
from the values of the traders’ demand correspondences at the price vector
p˜k such that
m˜k =
∫
L×2K×ZK
z˜`tk ζ(d`× dZ) (98)
But we have constructed the commodity space K in order to make the mean
endowment vector Eτ [e] =
∫
L×T e τ(d` × dt) strictly positive. So obviously
p˜ (Eτe) = Eτ [p˜ e] > 0. It follows that there is a subset V ⊆ L × T such
that τ(V ) > 0 and p˜ e > 0 for all (`, θ, e) ∈ V . Now, the net demand
correspondence Z`,t of each trader with label ` ∈ L and type t = (θ, e) ∈ T is
J(e)-regular, where J(e) = {g ∈ K | eg > 0}. So the boundary condition for
a J(e)-regular net demand correspondence implies that for all (`, θ, e) ∈ V
one has ∑
g∈K
z˜`tkg → +∞ as k →∞ (99)
But regularity also requires that z˜`tk = −e¯ for all (`, t) ∈ L × T , so (98)
implies that∑
g∈K
m˜kg ≥ [1− ζ(V )]
∑
g∈K
(−e¯g) +
∫
V
(∑
g∈K
z˜`tkg
)
ζ(d`× dZ)
But then (99) evidently implies that∑
g∈K
m˜kg → +∞ as k →∞ (100)
Now, the argument of the previous paragraphs leads to the conclusion
(100) for any sequence (p˜k)k∈N of price vectors satisfying p˜k ∈ P kK for each
k ∈ N which converges to a limit p˜ on the boundary of P . So (97) implies
that, given the convergent sequence (pk,mk)k∈N of fixed points in P ×M , the
associated sequence (pk)k∈N of price vectors cannot converge to the boundary
of P . Hence the limit price vector pˆ must satisfy pˆ ∈ P 0K .
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Market Clearing
We have just proved that, after choosing a subsequence if necessary, the
sequence (pk,mk)k∈N of fixed points converges to some pair (pˆ, mˆ) ∈ P ×RK
with
pˆ ∈ P 0K and mˆ 5 0 (101)
But (96) implies that pkmk = 0 for each k ∈ N, so pˆ mˆ = 0 in the limit as
k → ∞. Then (101) implies that mˆ cannot have any negative components,
so mˆ = 0.
Finally, therefore, we can conclude that 0 ∈ ∫
L×2K×ZK Z(pˆ;Z) ζ(d`× dZ),
as required for pˆ to be a Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium
Section 6 considers a spot market system where traders’ endowments are ob-
servable. We have just concluded the proof that, for each ζ ∈ M∗γ, there is
an equilibrium price vector p(ζ) ∈ P 0K along with an integrable equilibrium
allocation function L × 2K × ZK 3 (`, J,Z) 7→ z`(J,Z; ζ) satisfying the re-
quirements of Section 6.3. This confirms that player 0 can carry out Step 9
in the extensive form game set out in Section 8.1.
Finally, Section 7.6 considers a spot market demand revelation mecha-
nism after each trader described by an observable pair (`, J,Z) ∈ L×Z has
supplied to the warehouse a vector y ∈ RK satisfying y 5 e∧y¯`(J,Z; ζ), where
y¯`(J,Z; ζ) is the mandated supply vector. In effect, each trader’s endowment
vector has become y instead of e.
Introducing the second-stage net trade vector z+ := x+−y+ with y+ fixed
converts the second-stage budget constraint q x+ ≤ q y+ set out in (58) of
Section 7.5 to the simple constraint q z+ ≤ 0 of a pure exchange economy with
a trivial wealth distribution rule. It also converts the feasibility constraint
x+ = 0 to z+ = −y+, as in an exchange economy where y+ is the initial
endowment vector. Thus, our existence proof applies to this economy also.
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